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Who lawfully may be held in military custody without criminal charge? Itseems a simple question, and in some settings it is. But in the settings
that matter most at the moment—counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—it is
not simple at all. The very metrics of legality are disputed in those contexts, with
sharp disagreement regarding which bodies of law are relevant and what if any-
thing each actually says about the detention-scope issue.
This problem has been with us for some time. It has lurked in the background of
US detention operations in Afghanistan since 20011 and in Iraq since 2003.2 It is
central, of course, to the controversies surrounding the use of detention at Guan-
tanamo and in the United States itself.3 More than one hundred thousand individ-
uals have been detained without criminal charge across these settings,4 giving rise
to an immense amount of scholarship, advocacy and litigation along the way. Re-
markably, however, the question of who lawfully may be detained remains
unsettled in important respects.
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The problem exists along two distinct dimensions, only one of which do I ad-
dress in this article. First, we have indeterminacy at the group level insofar as there
is disagreement with respect to whether any authority to use military detention
that the US government may currently possess extends to any entities other than al
Qaeda and the Taliban, and also insofar as there is disagreement regarding which
entities are sufficiently affiliated with al Qaeda or the Taliban so as to be indistin-
guishable from them for purposes of this inquiry.5 Even if we had agreement re-
garding which groups are relevant for purposes of the detention issue, however,
indeterminacy also manifests at the individual level insofar as we also lack agree-
ment regarding the mix of conditions that are necessary or sufficient to justify the
detention of a particular person. My aim in this article is to shed light solely on this
individualized set of questions.
That we lack consensus with respect to individualized detention criteria and
constraints despite nearly a decade’s worth of litigation and debate to some extent
reflects our preoccupation with other questions associated with military deten-
tion, above all the seven years’ war over the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts
in relation to the Guantanamo detainees.6 Yet even prior to the resolution of that
jurisdictional dispute in the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v.
Bush,7 courts did have several occasions to address the detention-scope issue; they
just did not develop a consensus as a result. On the contrary, they splintered
sharply in those cases, advancing an array of incompatible views regarding the ap-
plicable law.8
Matters have improved to some extent in the aftermath of Boumediene.9 Many
district and circuit court judges have had a chance to address who lawfully may be
detained in the context of the Guantanamo habeas litigation. Their decisions re-
flect a consensus that the government does have authority to detain without crim-
inal charge in at least some circumstances, and that (at least for most of the judges)
these circumstances at a minimum include at least some scenarios involving per-
sons who are “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban (whether the consensus extends to
membership in other groups is much less clear). But beyond these points disagree-
ment reigns.
Whether a person is “part of” a group may be an administrable inquiry in the
context of a regular armed force, but it does not map easily onto scenarios involv-
ing clandestine non-State actors with indistinct and unstable organizational struc-
tures. As a result, judges who agree that members of such groups may be detained
do not necessarily agree as to what conduct actually counts as membership in this
context. And the judges most definitely have not reached consensus with respect to
whether detention lawfully may be used in the distinct situation in which a non-
member provides support to these groups. Indeed, the executive branch itself now
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appears divided on the propriety of using support as a stand-alone detention predi-
cate. Perhaps most remarkably, an apparent consensus as to the relevance of the
laws of war to these questions recently came unglued, with a divided panel of the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals declaring that the matter should turn exclusively on
domestic law considerations10 and a subsequent assertion by a majority of the ac-
tive judges of that court in turn declaring that assertion to be dicta.11
All of which is interesting in the seminar setting, but does any of it actually mat-
ter in practice? That is not a frivolous question. By and large the merits determina-
tions in the Guantanamo habeas cases have turned on the sufficiency of the
government’s evidence (or lack thereof), and not on the legal boundaries of the
government’s notional detention authority.12 For better or worse, moreover, habeas
jurisdiction has not (yet) been extended to overseas military detention operations
involving non-citizens at locations other than Guantanamo,13 and thus one might
be tempted to conclude that any problems resulting from the judiciary’s persistent
inability to resolve the detention-scope question will be confined to a finite and
shrinking set of cases.
In fact, the question of who lawfully may be detained matters a great deal in ac-
tual practice. As a threshold matter, the two premises mentioned above may prove
to be incorrect. Much Guantanamo habeas litigation is yet to come, and it may well
be that future cases will turn on this very issue. Similarly, the precise boundaries of
habeas jurisdiction have not yet been fixed; though currently jurisdiction does not
extend to Afghanistan, that question remains the subject of live litigation.14 Even if
those premises remain valid, however, other considerations ensure the relevance of
the detention-scope question.
First, the answers judges give to this question have spillover effects beyond the
immediate context of habeas.15 They overhang any other detention operations
conducted under the rubric of the same underlying detention authority, regardless
of whether those operations are subject to judicial review; government and military
lawyers will not simply ignore judicial pronouncements regarding the scope of that
authority, and may be expected to advise commanders and policymakers accord-
ingly. By the same token, judicial decisions regarding the notional scope of deten-
tion authority may apply by extension to questions of targeting with lethal force in
the field pursuant to that same authority, notwithstanding that targeting decisions
ordinarily are not directly subject to judicial review.16 Future conflicts unrelated to
9/11 may also be impacted. The judges in the habeas litigation at times have in-
cluded in their analyses interpretations of key terms and concepts from both inter-
national and domestic law—such as “direct participation in hostilities” and “all
necessary and appropriate force”—that will be relevant in most if not all future
armed conflicts.
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Taking all of this together, we can see that the judges in the habeas litigation are
not merely deciding whether to grant the writ in particular cases. They have be-
come, for better or worse, the central US government institution engaged in the
critical—and ultimately unavoidable—task of tailoring the laws governing mili-
tary activity to suit the increasingly important scenario in which States classify
clandestine non-State actors as strategic threats requiring a military response.
The paper proceeds in three parts. I begin at a high level of abstraction in Part I
by drawing attention to two strands of debate that greatly complicate the task of de-
termining whether particular detention criteria are forbidden, required or permit-
ted by law: (i) disagreement regarding which bodies of law actually apply in a
particular instance, and (ii) disagreement as to what a particular body of law has to
say, if anything, when it comes to employing particular criteria in a detention
standard.
Against this backdrop, Part II provides a comprehensive descriptive account of
how judges since 2002 have addressed the question of individual detention criteria,
emphasizing that which has been settled and that which remains in dispute. In
brief, judges largely (though not entirely) agree that detention authority lawfully
extends to persons who are functional members of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associ-
ated forces, but they do not agree as to what membership means in this setting or
whether detention authority also extends to non-members who provide support to
such groups. Part III concludes with a discussion of whether this lingering uncer-
tainty truly matters (it does, on many levels) and, if so, what should be done about
it (legislation, preferably).
I. Contested Metrics of Legality
Nearly a decade has passed since the United States began employing military de-
tention without criminal charge in circumstances relating to al Qaeda and the
Taliban. Nonetheless, the question of who lawfully may be held in that manner—if
anyone—remains the subject of bitter disagreement.
Before examining how litigants and judges have attempted to resolve these dis-
agreements in the habeas setting, it is worth pausing to describe why, at a high level
of abstraction, the parties to these debates so often appear to be speaking past one
another. There are two overarching problems that contribute to that state of affairs.
First, there is disagreement at the threshold with respect to which bodies of law
actually apply to this question. Should it be answered solely with reference to do-
mestic law? Law of armed conflict (LOAC)? International human rights law
(IHRL)? We might call this the “domain” debate. Second, with respect to each of
these potentially applicable bodies of law, there is disagreement as to what if
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anything it has to say regarding which detention predicates and constraints are
necessary or permissible. We might call this the “content” debate.
I do not propose to settle the domain and content debates here, nor even to en-
gage them in a comprehensive way. Rather, my goal simply is to orient the reader to
their basic features. Combined with the typology of detention predicates and con-
straints provided in the preceding Part, this will equip the reader to fully appreciate
the points of consensus and disagreement emerging from the habeas litigation
discussed in Part II.
A. The Domain Debate: Disagreement Regarding Which Bodies of Law Apply
Which bodies of law are relevant with respect to the detention-scope question? The
answer to this question of course may depend on the circumstances, and thus it
may be most accurate to say that there are many answers to it rather than just one.
But in any event, the candidate legal regimes include domestic law (statutory or
constitutional), LOAC (or international humanitarian law) and IHRL.
1. Domestic Law
At one extreme, the question of who lawfully may be held might require solely a
domestic law analysis. On this view, for example, one might first consider what the
September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force17 (AUMF) has to say
about the topic—or, if you prefer, what might be gleaned from the Constitution as
a direct source of detention power18—and then take note of any other limitations
that might be derived from the Constitution, other statutes, or prior US caselaw. If
the government’s claim of detention authority is consistent with these sources, the
debate ends.
Of course, treaties are part of domestic law in the sense that the Constitution
makes them supreme law of the land.19 Thus the “domestic-only” viewpoint does
not necessarily exclude consideration of LOAC and IHRL instruments. Insofar as
those treaties are not self-executing or have been “unexecuted” by a subsequent
statute, however, some argue that they are relevant solely in a diplomatic sense.20
At least with respect to IHRL instruments, moreover, the US government has long
maintained the position that they simply do not apply to US government conduct
occurring outside of formal US territory.21
In any event, the notion of a purely domestic approach to determining the legal
boundaries of detention authority is no mere academic invention. As we will see in
Part II below, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adopted precisely this view in its
January 2010 decision Al-Bihani v. Obama. There are, however, other models.
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2. The Law of Armed Conflict
The second model accepts the legal rather than just the diplomatic relevance of
LOAC. On this view, LOAC might matter in either of two ways, one weak and one
strong. First, on the weak view, LOAC must be considered when interpreting the
AUMF (or, for that matter, when interpreting the scope of authority conferred
directly by the Constitution).22 Consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, for ex-
ample, one would look to LOAC in order to flesh out the meaning of the AUMF’s
language “all necessary and appropriate force” as it relates to detention.23 Alterna-
tively, on the strong view, LOAC might be treated as a legally binding constraint in
its own right, independent of the best reading of the underlying domestic source
of authority.
It is not clear that the difference between the weak and strong models matters in
the context of the scope-of-detention issue. The difference might matter where the
underlying domestic source is so clear that there is no occasion for a LOAC-based
interpretation, thus making the weak but not the strong model inapplicable. But
that hardly seems to be the case here, given the relative lack of clarity of the domes-
tic sources involved. Applied in this setting, in other words, both the weak and
strong models would direct us to look to LOAC to define the scope of the
government’s detention authority.
All that said, LOAC is not automatically relevant in in all circumstances. It is,
rather, applicable in circumstances of “armed conflict.”24 In order to determine
LOAC’s field of application, one must identify and define the scope of “armed con-
flict”—tasks that generate considerable disputes. Some scholars reference func-
tional criteria involving the duration, intensity and nature of the violence at issue,25
while others also emphasize the formal categorization of the asserted “enemy” in
terms of its status as a “state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group.”26 Even when
one accepts that a state of armed conflict justifying application of LOAC exists in
one particular location, moreover, there is considerable disagreement as to
whether and when any resulting rules can or must be applied in relation to persons
in geographically distinct locations.27 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the
most fundamental divide separating the legal positions of the Bush and Obama ad-
ministrations from the views of critics in the international law community has to
do with the propositions that (i) the activities of al Qaeda rise to the level of armed
conflict in places other than Afghanistan and (ii) in any event the existence of
armed conflict in Afghanistan permits reliance on LOAC concepts against al
Qaeda–related individuals in other locations.28
118
Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:13 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
3. International Human Rights Law
The third model tracks the second, but looks to IHRL rather than LOAC. That is to
say, one can advance both a weak (interpretation-based) and strong (independent-
force) model of IHRL’s relevance to the scope question.
Either way, the key point of departure for debate regarding the relevance of
IHRL involves the question of extraterritoriality. For present purposes, the most
relevant IHRL treaty is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),29 which, as discussed below, contains language relating to detention.30
Article 2 of the ICCPR provides that a member State is bound to confer ICCPR
protections on persons “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”31 The
United States has long construed this language literally, such that ICCPR rules gov-
ern within the United States but not elsewhere.32 Many other States (including
many European allies), in contrast, construe that same language to encompass any
person subject to a member State’s practical control regardless of geographic loca-
tion, as does the UN Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights
Council).33 An interpretive standoff results, with great risk of outright misunder-
standing insofar as either side fails to appreciate that the other simply does not
share its view.
Even if one accepts the US position regarding the geographically bounded reach
of the ICCPR, however, IHRL issues might still arise. Not all detentions occur out-
side US territory, after all. On three occasions after 9/11, for example, the United
States held persons in military custody within the United States itself.34 And in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s Rasul and Boumediene decisions emphasizing the
unique degree of US control at Guantanamo, debate may yet arise as to its status
vis-à-vis the ICCPR’s jurisdictional provision. In any event, treaty law is not the
only possible source of an IHRL obligation. Customary international law may con-
tain norms comparable to those found in the ICCPR. The question then becomes
whether any such norm entails a comparable geographic boundary, and this in
turn may require inquiry into the existence in the overseas setting of a pattern of
State practice supported by opinio juris. The room for debate—and hence for
misunderstanding—is ample.
4. Deconfliction
The discussion grows still more complicated once one accounts for the potential of
the LOAC and IHRL models to overlap and conflict with one another. This poten-
tial overlap has occasioned an immense amount of scholarship, with some charac-
terizing the situation as encroachment by IHRL—for good or ill—on the
traditional domain of LOAC.35
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Here we confront the question of lex specialis. In brief, lex specialis is a choice-of-
law concept in which the more specifically applicable body of law governs in the
event of overlap.36 Unfortunately, a variety of views exists regarding just what that
concept means in practice—enough to prompt the International Law Commission
to undertake an effort to clarify the question.37 The US government, for its part,
takes the view that LOAC constitutes lex specialis in all circumstances of armed
conflict, such that it entirely occupies the field to the exclusion of IHRL consider-
ations.38 Some have taken a different view, treating lex specialis not as preempting
all reference to another body of law, but rather as requiring the provisions of a
competing body of law to be construed in harmony with the rules provided by the
dominant body of law; IHRL, on that view, would be applicable yet would be
conformed to LOAC in its particulars.39 Some might argue for a third position,
moreover, a rights-maximizing approach in which the controlling rule is which-
ever one that most advantages the rights of individuals, as opposed to advantag-
ing the discretion of the State. One might also contend for a specificity-oriented
approach in which the governing rule is, literally, whichever rule speaks with
greater specificity to the fact pattern (whether it is more rights-protective or not).40
Deconfliction of LOAC and IHRL, in short, requires resolution of a complex and
entrenched debate.
As if this were not enough complexity, it is of course possible that the best an-
swer to the relevant-body-of-law inquiry will vary depending on the circum-
stances. That is, it may be that in one location LOAC plainly is relevant and IHRL is
not, while in other locations the reverse is true and in still another location it might
be that the question turns partially or entirely on domestic law instead.
B. The Content Debate: Disagreement Regarding the Rules Themselves
Unfortunately, the opportunities for confusion and disagreement are not confined
to the threshold determination of which body or bodies of law matter. Even if we
had consensus on that question, an equally intransigent set of disagreements
emerges within each domain when we turn to the question of what that body of law
has to say, if anything, regarding the particular mix of detention predicates and
constraints that a State can or perhaps must use.
Note that in the abstract there are several possible outcomes when one seeks to
determine what rule a particular body of law supplies with respect to the detention-
scope issue. First, the body of law may provide a determinate and discernible rule
that is narrower than the scope of detention authority asserted by the government.
Or the reverse may be true; the rule may permit at least as much detention author-
ity as the government asserts. One can expect litigants to emphasize one or the
other of these positions. But there are other possibilities. Most notably, it may be
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that the body of law is simply indeterminate on the question of scope. In that case,
an important question arises regarding the default state of affairs. Does the absence
of a rule constitute an absence of affirmative authority for the government to exer-
cise detention power? Or instead does it constitute an absence of constraint on the
government’s exercise of such powers? This too can be a point of disagreement. Fi-
nally, it may be that the most complete answer involves a blend of the
aforementioned possibilities depending on the circumstances.
1. Domestic Law
Consider first how these possibilities map onto the domestic law sources relevant
to the substantive-scope question. One might begin with the September 18, 2001
AUMF,41 which introduces a series of interpretive issues.
The AUMF does not refer expressly to detention. Of course, it also says nothing
express about killing or any other particular kind of military activity. What it does
authorize is the use of “all necessary and appropriate force.”42 Thus there is a
threshold question as to whether it should be read to confer any detention author-
ity at all. In the case of citizens, moreover, that inquiry is complicated by the exis-
tence of a 1971 statute—the Non-Detention Act—providing that “[n]o citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress,”43 as well as the Civil War–era precedent Ex parte Milligan in
which the Supreme Court employed broad language in the course of holding that a
civilian could not be subjected to a military commission trial where civilian courts
were open.44
Assuming this obstacle is overcome, the next task is to determine against whom
this authority may be directed. Here, the AUMF does a bit more of the work, as it
refers to “those nations, organizations, and persons” whom the President deter-
mines were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, as well as those who harbor such enti-
ties.45 The Bush administration exercised this authority by identifying al Qaeda as
the entity responsible for the attacks and the Taliban as having harbored it, the
Obama administration has continued that position,46 and there does not appear to
be any serious doubt that it was appropriate to do so. Thus it seems settled that the
AUMF refers at least to al Qaeda and the Taliban.47
Even if we had consensus regarding precisely which entities fall within the scope
of the AUMF, however, we would still have to grapple with disagreement at the
individual level. The AUMF is entirely silent with respect to the mix of detention
predicates and constraints that suffice to link a particular person to an AUMF-
covered group, for purposes of detention or otherwise.
This is, in fact, typical of AUMFs (and declarations of war, for that matter).48 Yet
no one in prior conflicts thought such silence to be significant. Why does it matter
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so much now? First, most prior conflicts involved nation-States as the enemy;
hence the question of detention largely arose in relation to enemy soldiers who
were both readily identifiable (through uniforms and through their overt presence
on a conventional battlefield) and eager to actually be identified (in order to ensure
prisoner-of-war (POW) treatment and qualification for the combatant’s privilege
to use force).49 Second, even where prior conflicts involved a substantial amount of
hostilities with guerrilla forces—as in Vietnam—the question of how the United
States resolved any incipient detention issues simply did not receive anything re-
motely resembling the scrutiny that arises today (let alone litigation). Matters are
otherwise in relation to the use of detention under the AUMF, to say the least, and
thus the question of individualized detention predicates and constraints is far
more significant than in the past.
No other domestic law sources suffice to prevent debate and disagreement on
these points. Congress, for its part, has not returned to the question of scope, at
least not directly. The first post-AUMF legislation to address detention in any sig-
nificant way was the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),50 which among other
things addressed the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear challenges to individual
detention decisions at Guantanamo.51 The DTA did not purport to define a sub-
stantive standard as to who may be detained, however, but rather invited the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals to consider in particular cases whether the government’s
assertion of detention authority was compatible with the “Constitution and laws of
the United States.”52
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA 2006) came closer.53 It did not
purport to define the category of persons subject to detention without charge
under the AUMF (or otherwise). It did, however, define the personal jurisdiction
of the military commission system. Specifically, it stated that commissions could
try cases involving any alien constituting an “unlawful enemy combatant.”54 It
defined that phrase in turn to encompass any person who is not part of a State’s
regular armed forces (or a militia-type group obeying the traditional conditions of
lawful belligerency), and who falls into one of three categories: (i) “has engaged in
hostilities . . . against the United States or its co-belligerents”; (ii) “has purpose-
fully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents”; or (iii) “is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces.”55
The MCA 2006 thus introduced a series of necessary and sufficient conditions to
bring a person within the jurisdiction of the new war-crime trial system—condi-
tions that were narrowed only slightly with the subsequent passage of the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009).56 The MCA 2009 replaced the verbiage
“unlawful enemy combatant” with the less baggage-laden phrase “unprivileged en-
emy belligerent.”57 It kept the criteria relating to participation in hostilities and
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material support of hostilities.58 It also kept the “part of” test, but narrowed it to
pertain only to al Qaeda—thus omitting the alternative of establishing personal ju-
risdiction over an individual solely on the ground that he was part of the Taliban or
an associated force.59
The MCA 2006 and MCA 2009 arguably shed some light on the substantive-
scope question, but for at least two reasons they do not suffice to end debate. First,
neither statute actually purports to speak to that question.60 Perhaps they nonethe-
less do so by implication, on the theory that the boundaries of personal jurisdiction
in the military commission system must extend at least as far as the boundaries of
the authority to detain without criminal charge. But it is not obvious that the two
questions have such a relationship to one another; one might expect the scope of
personal jurisdiction to be wider than baseline detention authority in some re-
spects and narrower in others.
Second, the MCA criteria themselves are underspecified. In terms of predicates,
the criteria include both past conduct considerations (including both personal in-
volvement in hostilities and the provision of support to AUMF-covered groups)
and an associational status test (the “part of” test). The “part of” test is not further
calibrated, however, leaving considerable room for disagreement. This is an im-
portant omission given the diffused, evolving and informal organizational struc-
ture of non-State actors such as al Qaeda.61 As for potential constraints, moreover,
the MCA criteria are silent with respect to considerations of geography and timing.
Complicating matters, some observers may take the position that the ambiguity
of these statutes constitutes an implied delegation of authority to the executive to
provide whatever further criteria may be required—and perhaps also that the exec-
utive branch is entitled to deference from the judiciary in the event that its exercise
of that authority should become subject to judicial review.62 This too becomes a
point of departure for debate, as would any claim that the Constitution itself (via
some combination of Article II powers, presumably) confers some degree of deten-
tion authority independent of what may be conferred by the AUMF or any other
statute. As to the latter argument, it suffices to note that the problems of ambiguity
associated with the language of the AUMF surely arise in equal if not greater
measure under the Article II authority rubric.
2. The Law of Armed Conflict
Assume for the sake of argument that LOAC is relevant in at least some post-9/11
circumstances involving detention. Unfortunately, it too is underspecified when it
comes to individual detention predicates and constraints.
When it comes to the scope-of-detention issue, LOAC is most determinate in
relation to international armed conflict—i.e., an armed conflict involving on each
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side at least one High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions. In that tradi-
tional setting, the full range of Geneva Convention protections applies,63 including
a host of provisions that expressly contemplate the use of non-criminal modes of
detention in military custody.
Under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW), for example, we find two articles confirming that a State may hold prison-
ers of war in custody without charge during hostilities.64 GPW, Article 4, more-
over, provides a detailed definition as to who qualifies for POW status (and hence
may be detained without much controversy). Among other things, this includes
any person who
(i) is a member of the armed forces of a party;
(ii) is a member of an irregular unit that obeys the four conditions of lawful
belligerency (having a command hierarchy, wearing a distinctive sign,
bearing arms openly and obeying the laws of war); or
(iii) is a member of regular armed forces belonging to a government that the
detaining State does not recognize.65
The central concept in each instance is membership. And as noted above, the
concept of membership (or being “part of” a group) at least in some contexts can
be a difficult concept to apply. Not so in this setting, however. The concept of
membership in structured armed forces presents few definitional issues. The use of
uniforms and the likelihood that a captured member of such a group willingly will
concede such status in order to obtain the benefits of POW treatment further
reinforce clarity.
When a person does not qualify for POW status in the context of an interna-
tional armed conflict, it does not follow that he or she cannot be detained without
criminal charge. On the contrary, the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC) expressly contemplates a non-
criminal regime of “security internment” for persons who are not POWs, but
nonetheless pose a threat to security in relation to an armed conflict.66 And while
the security internment provisions of the GC are largely silent with respect to the
individualized criteria for triggering this authority, the International Committee of
the Red Cross’s commentaries on the GC note that this omission was intentional
on the part of the drafters, who thought it best to leave the question of scope to the
discretion of the detaining State—though the commentaries themselves offer the
opinion that this authority might be applied, as one example, to intern individuals
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based on their membership in a dangerous organization.67 The GC framework, in
short, endorses something in the nature of a generalized future dangerousness in-
quiry, and does not demand particular forms of prior conduct or associational
status.
If the question of detention authority arose only in the context of international
armed conflict, then, the existence and scope of detention authority might gener-
ate little debate. Of course we might still have debates regarding the labels to be ap-
plied to detainees, and the resulting benefits to be given them. In the event of a spy
or saboteur, for example, one might debate whether the person should be treated
as a POW or a security internee, or perhaps instead placed in an interstitial cate-
gory for unprivileged belligerents.68 But there would be little doubt as to the basic
capacity to detain without charge given the existence of express and sweeping
treaty language.
For armed conflicts that are not international in the sense described above,
however, the situation is quite different. Prior to 1949, no LOAC treaty instrument
purported to apply beyond the confines of an international armed conflict. The
1949 Geneva Conventions broke new ground by including a single article—so-
called “Common Article 3”—imposing a handful of baseline humanitarian
protections for persons in the hands of the enemy during such conflicts. Additional
Protocol II subsequently expanded upon those protections (though the United
States is not party to that instrument). Neither instrument explicitly confers sub-
stantive detention authority, nor does either purport to limit or deny such
authority.
The resulting opportunities for disagreement are considerable. Some construe
the silence as fatal for any effort to rest the existence of detention authority on
LOAC, let alone to use LOAC to define the scope of that authority.69 On that
view, both authority and definitional scope must derive from other bodies of law
(domestic, IHRL or both).70 Others, however, contend that the absence of affir-
mative constraint is equivalent to an authorization by omission, on the theory
that LOAC on the whole is best understood to be a restraining body of law.71 On
this view, anything that can be done in an international armed conflict a fortiori
can be done as well during non-international armed conflict—including use of
the detention principles noted above.72 Alternatively, some might take the posi-
tion that some form of affirmative LOAC authority is needed, and that customary
LOAC supplies it (again by analogy to the forms recognized by treaty in the inter-
national setting).73
For those drawn to either of the latter two arguments, further issues emerge. In-
sofar as a State seeks to bring to bear detention authority akin to the GPW-based
power to detain members of the enemy armed force, for example, applying the
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“membership” concept will not be a simple affair when used in connection with
relatively disorganized non-State actors such as insurgencies or terrorist networks.
The POW definition in GPW, Article 4 will not provide much assistance in that cir-
cumstance, predicated as it is on the assumption of an organized armed force with
a command hierarchy, uniforms and the like.
Of course, a State might seek to avoid such definitional difficulties by instead
analogizing to the more-sweeping detention authority associated with security
internment under the GC. But the very feature that might make this attractive—
the lack of any particular substantive criteria—is sure to invite objections. Such
objections no doubt will be muted if the context involves sustained, large-scale,
combat violence; the United States employed security internment to detain tens of
thousands of individuals in Iraq over the years following the international armed
conflict and occupation phases in 2003 and 2004, without engendering any serious
objections regarding the existence and scope of its detention authority, and this
pattern continues on a small scale today long after the expiration of the UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions that for a time provided an ad hoc positive law blessing for
this arrangement.74 But one should expect the opposite if instead the setting in-
volves only episodic violence of a type not as readily associated in the public’s mind
with combat and an enemy “force” that is non-hierarchical or otherwise indeter-
minate in its structure and boundaries. In that case, arguments emerge as to
whether the threshold of “armed conflict” has been crossed in the first instance75
and, even if so, whether the broad discretion associated with the GC security in-
ternment system makes sense in the context of this particular form of violence.
3. International Human Rights Law
Though IHRL refers to a diverse array of treaties and international customary law
norms, for present purposes it suffices to focus attention on one treaty and one
norm in particular: the prohibition of arbitrary detention contained in Article 9 of
the ICCPR.76 Article 9 provides that all persons have a “right to liberty” and thus a
State shall not deprive a person of liberty “except on such grounds and in accor-
dance with such procedure as are established by law.”77 That is to say, a State may
not hold a person in custody at its own whim as opposed to doing so based on a
claim that detention in that circumstance is authorized by law.
Or at least it may not do so ordinarily. The ICCPR also provides that in the event
of a public proclamation of an emergency “which threatens the life of the nation,”
States may “take measures derogating” from certain ICCPR obligations, including
the prohibition on arbitrary detention.78 Then again, the United States has not in-
voked the derogation option (presumably because the US government position is
126
Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:13 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially and that LOAC in any event con-
trols over the ICCPR by virtue of the lex specialis principle, as discussed above).
Assuming that Article 9 is applicable, then, the question arises whether US gov-
ernment claims of detention authority after 9/11 might violate that norm. The US
government presumably would argue that military detention conducted under the
auspices of the AUMF satisfies Article 9, on the theory that the AUMF is a “law” es-
tablishing the “grounds” for such detention. In response, one might contend that
Article 9 contemplates only criminal law as a source of detention authority, but
there is substantial reason to doubt that Article 9 requires such an approach.79
Assuming that some degree of non-criminal detention is compatible with Article 9
(or, if one prefers, with an equivalent customary norm against arbitrary deten-
tion), we then reach the question whether the government’s claim of some particu-
lar mix of detention predicates and constraints in some way violates IHRL. Here,
however, IHRL seems not to have anything particular to say; neither the ICCPR,
nor any other IHRL treaty to which the United States is a party, nor any customary
norm of IHRL purports to offer a substantive definition of non-criminal de-
tention authority.80
II. Habeas Litigation and the Scope of the Detention Power
Against the backdrop of uncertainty described in Part I, federal courts have strug-
gled for nine years to identify the mix of detention predicates and constraints per-
missibly defining the substantive scope of the government’s military detention
authority at the level of the individual. The range of resulting disagreements is
remarkable.
My aim in this Part is to provide a relatively comprehensive descriptive account
of these doctrinal disputes. I proceed in semi-chronological fashion, beginning
with the often-overlooked habeas opinions associated with the three individuals
who were held as “enemy combatants” within the United States after 9/11 and then
moving on to a review of the pre- and post-Boumediene Guantanamo habeas opin-
ions. The survey documents considerable and persistent points of disagreement.
A. The First Wave of Detention Criteria Caselaw: Hamdi, Padilla and Al-Marri
For several years following 9/11, the judiciary largely was preoccupied with ques-
tions of jurisdiction, not substantive law. Most detainees were non-citizens cap-
tured abroad and held outside the United States, after all, and as a result did not
have a clearly established right to seek judicial review until the Supreme Court con-
clusively resolved that question in its 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush. None-
theless, judges did have occasion to address the matter of individual detention
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predicates and constraints in a handful of cases in the pre-Boumediene era, including
a trio of cases involving detainees held in the United States (one originally captured
in a combat setting abroad, and two captured in the United States itself).
1. The Scope of Detention Authority in Relation to Conventional Battlefield
Captures Involving the Taliban
The sole post-9/11 instance in which the Supreme Court of the United States has
addressed the substantive-scope issue to any serious extent is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
in which a majority of the Court concluded that (i) associational status—in partic-
ular, serving as an arms-bearing member of a Taliban military unit—sufficed as a
detention predicate at least where the detention occurred on the field in Afghani-
stan and while combat operations continue in that location, and (ii) being a US cit-
izen does not exempt a person from being subject to such detention authority.
Yaser Hamdi had come into US custody in Afghanistan after being captured by
Northern Alliance forces in the fall of 2001. The United States initially believed that
Hamdi was a citizen of Saudi Arabia, but learned after bringing him to Guan-
tanamo that he had been born in Louisiana and hence could claim to be a US
citizen as well. As a result he was moved to a detention facility inside the United
States, and he no longer faced the jurisdictional hurdles then preventing other
Guantanamo detainees from obtaining habeas review.
Hamdi’s case presented a relatively easy fact pattern from the viewpoint of the
substantive-scope issue. He was not alleged to be an al Qaeda member or asso-
ciate, and he was not captured in circumstances seemingly unrelated to conven-
tional armed conflict. Rather, the government claimed, he was an arms-bearing
fighter for the Taliban who had been captured with his unit and his weapon while
fleeing the battlefield in Afghanistan. Hamdi denied that this was true, but for
present purposes the important point is that the allegations cleanly presented the
question whether a person meeting that description lawfully could be held with-
out criminal charge.
The fact pattern actually posed two distinct substantive-scope questions. First,
did the government have authority to detain any person in this situation—i.e.,
bearing arms for the Taliban in Afghanistan? Second, if the government did have
such authority as a general proposition, would the answer change if the person
happened to be a US citizen? The Supreme Court splintered in response to these
questions.
A plurality of the Court in an opinion by Justice O’Connor upheld both the gov-
ernment’s notional assertion of some authority to detain, as well as its claim that such
authority extended at least to Hamdi’s alleged circumstances—and Justice Thomas
provided a fifth vote for these conclusions in a separate opinion.81 To begin with, the
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plurality framed the issue as turning on a question of domestic law informed by
reference to international law—i.e., the plurality focused on the meaning of the
AUMF as construed in light of the law of armed conflict.82 As to the existence of
some authority to detain, no treaty-based detention provision appeared directly
applicable; Hamdi was not held as a prisoner of war or security internee, and the
conflict in Afghanistan by 2004 no longer appeared to be an international armed
conflict in any event. Nonetheless, the plurality concluded that detention was a
traditional “incident” of warfare and thus, presumably, a necessary part of what-
ever body of customary LOAC principles might govern in this setting.83 As for who
precisely might be detained as a result, the plurality concluded that detention
authority at least extended to persons who engaged in a particular combination of
past conduct and associational status: bearing arms as part of a Taliban military
unit in Afghanistan.84 Emphasizing that the point of military detention is preven-
tive incapacitation, moreover, the plurality expressly rejected the idea that deten-
tion might be justified on the collateral ground that a person may possess useful
intelligence.
The plurality pointedly did not express any view as to the existence or scope of
detention authority in other settings. It did not say whether detention authority ex-
tended beyond the Taliban to al Qaeda. It did not address the power to detain per-
sons captured outside of Afghanistan, or persons who did not literally bear arms on
a conventional battlefield. It merely observed that the “legal category of enemy
combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail,” and that the “permissible
bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are
presented to them.”85 The plurality did caution, however, that its “understanding
is based on longstanding law-of-war principles,” and that “[i]f the practical cir-
cumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that in-
formed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel.”86
2. The Scope of Detention Authority in Relation to Domestic Captures Involving
al Qaeda
The Hamdi decision left open more questions than it answered. What conduct
other than bearing arms on the battlefield might count as membership in an
AUMF-covered group justifying detention? Would membership continue to be
sufficient if a person were to be captured outside Afghanistan, or if the linkage was
to al Qaeda rather than the Taliban? Could conduct aside from membership—
especially providing material support—provide an independent sufficient condi-
tion for detention in any location?
The cases of Jose Padilla and Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri provided an early oppor-
tunity to address some of these loose ends. Unlike Guantanamo detainees, but like
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Yaser Hamdi, both were in a position to seek habeas review with little in the way of
jurisdictional disputes. Padilla was an American citizen captured in Chicago and
eventually taken into military custody on the ground that he was an al Qaeda
sleeper agent who had come back to the United States to assist or even personally
participate in terrorist attacks. Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen, likewise was arrested in-
side the United States and then later transferred to military custody based on his al-
leged role as an al Qaeda sleeper agent. Neither, it initially appeared, was directly
connected to the conventional battlefield in Afghanistan or to the Taliban.
The Padilla litigation moved forward quickly. Indeed, the substantive detention
authority question was before Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of
New York by December of 2002.87 As an initial matter, he found that the President
had general authority to use military force against al Qaeda as a result of both the
AUMF and Article II of the Constitution, and that the substantive scope of the re-
sulting detention authority could be determined at least in part by reference to
LOAC (at least insofar as LOAC takes the form of treaties to which the United
States is a party, such as GPW).88 LOAC, Judge Mukasey concluded, permits the
detention without charge of persons who qualify as either lawful or unlawful com-
batants.89 He did not elaborate the conditions necessary to show that a person fits
into one or the other category; that is, he did not specify whether lawful and unlaw-
ful combatancy turns on conduct, status or both. He did, however, expressly reject
the notion that Padilla should be exempt from detention simply because he was a
citizen or because he was captured within the United States, and he implicitly re-
jected the notion that detention authority extends only to persons who actually
bore arms on a conventional battlefield.90
Padilla appealed, and in late 2003 prevailed in a decision from a divided panel of
the Second Circuit.91 For Judges Pooler and Parker, the critical facts were Padilla’s
status as a citizen and his arrest within the United States—i.e., away from a conven-
tional battlefield.92 In that specific scenario, they concluded, the Constitution re-
quires that any power to detain be conferred expressly by statute, not implicitly.93
The AUMF, in this view, lacked sufficient clarity.94
This set the stage for Supreme Court review, or so it appeared. In the end, how-
ever, the Court avoided the issue. In an opinion issued simultaneously with the
Court’s Hamdi ruling, the Court held that the petition in Padilla’s case should have
been filed in South Carolina (the state in which Padilla was held at the time he filed)
rather than in New York (the state in which he initially had been held).95 Litigation
thus had to begin anew at the district court level.
On remand to the District of South Carolina, Judge Floyd adopted the Second
Circuit’s view that detention authority did not apply to an American captured in
the United States (absent a clear statement from Congress of its intention to convey
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such authority), and then added an additional reason to believe Padilla in particu-
lar could not be detained.96 The phrase “all necessary and appropriate force” in the
AUMF, he argued, should be construed rather literally; any exercise of force must
be “necessary” in the strict sense that no adequate non-military alternative is avail-
able. Padilla could not be detained militarily, on this view, because he could be
(and indeed for a time had been) incapacitated instead through the civilian crimi-
nal justice system.97
A few months later, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed, albeit on somewhat unex-
pected grounds.98 Referencing the Hamdi plurality opinion, Judge Luttig ex-
plained that the ultimate question is whether the AUMF, as construed in light of
LOAC, confers detention authority in a particular case.99 Hamdi had settled the
point as to a Taliban member captured in the field in Afghanistan, whereas the
Padilla litigation had seemed to present the question whether the same result ob-
tained for an al Qaeda member captured far from conventional combat. But as re-
stated in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, Padilla’s fact pattern looked much more like
that in Hamdi after all. Padilla, Judge Luttig emphasized, had received military
training at an al Qaeda facility in Afghanistan and was present there as part of an
armed al Qaeda unit serving the Taliban at the time of the US military intervention
after 9/11.100 The only notable difference between Hamdi and Padilla, in this view,
was that the latter managed to evade capture until far from the battlefield.101 This
was no reason to deny the government’s detention authority in the panel’s view,
even when the capture occurred within the United States.102
Once more the stage seemed set for Supreme Court review. What would have
occurred next remains a mystery, however, as the government soon transferred
Padilla back to civilian custody in order to prosecute him in Florida. The move pre-
cipitated criticism in some quarters, and prompted a manifestly unhappy Judge
Luttig to vacate his earlier opinion on the merits. Nonetheless, Padilla’s special role
as the vehicle for fleshing out the substantive law of detention had come to an end.
Going forward, it seemed that it would be the contemporaneous al-Marri litigation
that tested the boundaries of detention authority.
Like Padilla, Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri initially pursued habeas relief in the
wrong jurisdiction, and as a result no judge addressed the merits in his case until
2005.103 Eventually he refiled his petition in South Carolina, and like Padilla his
case came before Judge Floyd. As noted above, Judge Floyd in early 2005 had con-
strued the AUMF not to provide detention authority in Padilla’s case, and since his
opinion addressing the same issue in al-Marri’s case came down just a few months
later—before the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Floyd’s Padilla ruling—al-Marri no
doubt expected a similar result. But it turned out otherwise. Judge Floyd drew a
sharp distinction between citizens such as Padilla and non-citizens such as al-Marri,
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notwithstanding the latter’s lawful residence in the United States.104 Citizenship,
on this view, had been not just an important but a necessary condition of Judge
Floyd’s earlier, strict reading of the AUMF. For non-citizens, Judge Floyd would
insist on neither express statutory language conferring detention authority nor a
strict reading of “necessity” such that military detention is not available when
criminal prosecution suffices as an alternative.105 Judge Floyd’s Al-Marri opinion
thus emerged alongside that of Judge Mukasey in Padilla as broad endorsements of
detention authority away from the conventional battlefield.
Approximately one year later, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit yet again re-
versed.106 The panel majority, written by Judge Motz, framed its analysis, at least at
the outset, in terms of a domestic law consideration that would not necessarily ap-
ply to non-citizens captured outside the United States. Specifically, Judge Motz
emphasized that al-Marri, though a non-citizen, was lawfully present in the United
States at the time of his arrest and hence able to invoke the protections of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.107 The manner in which she elaborated the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment in this context, however, had sweeping implica-
tions for the scope of the government’s detention power even in other settings. The
Fifth Amendment, she explained, generally precludes detention other than pursu-
ant to criminal conviction, subject only to a fixed number of narrowly defined ex-
ceptions.108 One such exception is the power to detain an enemy combatant during
war,109 and the boundaries of that category must be ascertained by reference to
LOAC.110 The court’s analysis of the Fifth Amendment issue thus became a vehicle
for staking out a position regarding LOAC’s general approach to the substantive-
scope issue—a position that would carry implications for any detention carried out
under color of LOAC, regardless of whether the detainee had Fifth Amendment
rights or access to judicial review.
What precisely did the panel conclude with respect to LOAC’s treatment of the
detention question? The opinion began by asserting that LOAC “provides clear
rules for determining an individual’s status” as either a “combatant” or a “civilian”
in the context of international armed conflict. The panel asserted that civilians
were categorically immune from military detention without criminal charge, fail-
ing to account for the security internment regime provided in the GC.111 LOAC,
the panel concluded, contemplated detention solely for combatants.
As to who constituted a combatant, the panel looked to GPW, Article 4, which
defines eligibility for POW status.112 That is to say, the panel equated eligibility for
detention with eligibility for POW status, adding that LOAC treats as “combat-
ants” only those who fight for the military arm of a nation-State, not just any armed
group.113 Indeed, the panel added, there simply was no such thing as “combatant”
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status—and hence no LOAC-based detention authority—outside the context of
international armed conflict.114
This was fatal to the attempt to detain al-Marri. Hamdi had been detainable in
theory because of his alleged affiliation with the military arm of the Taliban, with
the Taliban functioning as the de facto government of Afghanistan. Padilla’s eligi-
bility ultimately rested on the same ground (according to the Fourth Circuit at
least, even if not Judge Floyd).115 Al-Marri, in contrast, was a “mere” al Qaeda
member with no alleged prior role as a de facto Taliban battlefield fighter. At most
he was someone associated with the enemy in a non-international armed conflict in
which there simply was no LOAC-based detention authority. No al Qaeda member
could be detained, on this view, absent the coincidence of having been in the field
in Afghanistan in a context that could be described as bearing arms for the
Taliban—whether later captured in the United States or not.
But the al-Marri litigation was not over. The government successfully sought
en banc review, resulting in a reversal of the panel by a narrow margin—and a pro-
found splintering of opinion regarding the substantive bounds of the govern-
ment’s detention authority.116 Four judges, in a new opinion by Judge Motz,
endorsed the panel’s original rationale.117 Five other judges disagreed, albeit for
different reasons.
Judge Traxler, in an opinion joined in relevant part by Judge Niemeyer, concen-
trated on the language of the AUMF itself, and in particular on its reference to the
use of force against “organizations” as well as “nations” found to be linked to the
9/11 attacks.118 In their view, the AUMF reflects a legislative intent to permit mili-
tary force against al Qaeda, above all.119 They did not dispute that LOAC defined
limits on how such force might be employed, but rejected the panel’s conclusion
that LOAC permitted detention only when dealing with members of the military
arm of an actual nation-State.120
Judge Williams, in a separate opinion joined by Judge Duncan, offered a view
that was simultaneously broad and narrow. Like Judge Traxler, Judge Williams re-
jected the claim that the detention authority conferred by the AUMF should be
read to apply only to members of the military arm of a government. But whereas
Judge Traxler suggested that LOAC imposed no such limitation, Judge Williams
accepted that the panel’s approach “may very well be correct” as a statement of
LOAC; he simply did not think that any such LOAC-based restraints survived the
AUMF’s explicit reference to the use of force against “organizations” as well as “na-
tions” linked to the 9/11 attacks.121 Interestingly, however, Judge Williams in an-
other sense did define detention authority narrowly. Rather than refer to mere
membership in or association with an enemy force as sufficient to justify detention
under the AUMF, he advanced a conduct-based criterion: one must “attempt[] or
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engage[] in belligerent acts against the United States” on “behalf of an enemy
force” in order to be subject to detention on this model.122 Further complicating
matters, moreover, Judge Williams (somewhat inconsistently) held open the pos-
sibility that detention authority might not continue to exist when the United States
was no longer engaged in conventional combat operations in Afghanistan.123
Then we have the distinctive opinion of Judge Wilkinson.124 His analysis began
relatively conventionally, exploring whether the AUMF on its own terms plausibly
could be read to limit detention authority to members of government-sponsored
armed forces or persons who literally fought on a conventional battlefield.125 Nei-
ther its broad terms nor the legislative intent giving rise to it could be squared with
such limits, he concluded.126
Next, Judge Wilkinson considered whether the broad scope of detention au-
thority seemingly conferred by the AUMF could be reconciled with any applicable
constitutional limitations given that al-Marri had been lawfully resident in the
United States.127 Citing Hamdi, Judge Wilkinson observed that the government
constitutionally may detain persons who count as “enemy combatants.”128 The
task at the heart of the constitutional inquiry, therefore, was to identify the con-
tours of the “enemy combatant” category.129 Toward that end, Judge Wilkinson
reasoned that one must look to “traditional law of war principles.”130 LOAC was
“not binding of its own force,” he cautioned. But it mattered nonetheless because it
“informs our understanding of the war powers in Articles I and II and of the enemy
combatant category.”131
Having clarified his motivation for doing so, Judge Wilkinson proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of LOAC’s treatment of the detention question.132 In accord
with Judge Motz—and likewise without reference to the security internment
framework in the GC—Judge Wilkinson accepted that LOAC permitted detention
without criminal charge solely for combatants, not for civilians.133 He differed
sharply from Judge Motz, however, with respect to the scope of the combatant cat-
egory. Whereas Judge Motz effectively equated combatancy with eligibility for
POW status, Judge Wilkinson accepted the government’s contention that some in-
dividuals lose their eligibility for POW status by flouting LOAC yet nonetheless re-
main “combatants” subject to targeting and detention.134 On that view, POW
status is not the measure of combatancy, nor was any “single factor” a necessary or
sufficient condition to establish that status.135 The most one could say, Judge
Wilkinson argued, was that the category “traditionally included ‘most members of
the armed forces’” as well as “those ‘who associate themselves with the military arm
of the enemy government,’”136 and that key indicia included self-identification
through the wearing of uniforms, involvement in the command structure of a
party to the conflict or presence on the battlefield.137
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At this point in his analysis, however, Judge Wilkinson introduced a distin-
guishing proposition: that LOAC is evolving in the face of asymmetric warfare
and mass-casualty terrorism, bringing with it corresponding change to the con-
cept of combatancy.138 He expressly embraced the proposition that law and stra-
tegic context exist in dynamic relationship,139 and argued that LOAC in particular
had “consistently accommodated changes in the conduct of war and in interna-
tional relations.”140 In our own era, he observed, war was becoming “less a state-
based enterprise,” with the diffusion of destructive technologies enabling super-
empowered non-State actors to pose a strategic threat to States.141 “Thus,” he
concluded, “while the principle of discrimination and the category of enemy
combatant surely remain a vital part of the law of war, they most definitely must
accommodate the new threats to the security of nations.”142
All of which raised two questions. Precisely how should LOAC evolve? And
through which institutional mechanisms should such evolution be effectuated or
recognized?
As to the latter point, Judge Wilkinson contended that the elected branches of
the government already had expressed their opinion of the matter by expressly in-
cluding “organizations” in addition to States in the AUMF’s text. But he also stated
at the outset of the opinion that the time had come to “develop” a new, tailored le-
gal framework to accommodate LOAC to the evolving strategic climate,143 and he
proceeded at this point in his analysis to offer his own perspective as to how best
this could be done.144 Going forward, he argued, the inquiry into combatant status
ought to turn on a three-step inquiry: a combatant is a person who is
(1) . . . a member of (2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared
war or authorized the use of military force, and (3) [who] knowingly plans or engages
in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of further-
ing military goals of the enemy nation or organization.145
The Wilkinson test, in short, combines a membership inquiry with a conduct
test, thus arriving at a result not unlike that advanced by Judge Williams. As to
membership, Judge Wilkinson conceded that identifying a sufficient degree of
association with a non-State actor would be more difficult than, say, ascertaining
citizenship.146 Nonetheless, he argued, the concept could be measured with refer-
ence to criteria such as “self-identification with the organization through verbal
or written statements; participation in the group’s hierarchy or command struc-
ture; or knowingly taking overt steps to aid or participate in the organization’s ac-
tivities.”147 As for the additional requirement of involvement in hostile conduct,
Judge Wilkinson suggested that this criterion would encompass both those who
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literally engage in hostilities and those who merely engage in preliminary steps to-
ward such acts (as with a “sleeper cell”), but that it would not also reach the
members of an enemy organization otherwise (and hence would not encompass
an al Qaeda doctor, for example).148
The net result of the Traxler, Williams and Wilkinson opinions was a five-vote
majority rejecting the proposition that the AUMF conferred detention authority
solely as to those who fought for the armed forces of a government or those who
had fought on a conventional battlefield. The five-vote block did not agree, how-
ever, with respect to whether membership in a non-State organization such as al
Qaeda must be joined with hostile individual conduct in order for detention au-
thority to attach, and it was unclear what the four-vote block associated with the
opinion of Judge Motz might think of that proposition.
The al-Marri litigation would shed no further light on these questions. The Su-
preme Court did grant certiorari in the case, but as had happened with Padilla pre-
viously, the government at that point mooted the case by transferring al-Marri to
civilian custody to face criminal prosecution—prompting the Supreme Court to
vacate the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remand the case to be dismissed as
moot.149 Thus ended the last of the suits challenging the government’s detention
authority in the exceptionally complicated—and exceptionally uncommon—con-
text of US citizen detainees and other persons captured inside the United States.
Some things seemed to have been settled along the way, others not. The judges
uniformly agreed that the AUMF conferred some detention authority, including at
least the authority to reach Taliban fighters—even US citizens—captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. Beyond this, however, the judges disagreed sharply.
Some rejected the proposition that the authority could extend to al Qaeda–linked
individuals, while others took the contrary view. Among those accepting that de-
tention authority could extend to the context of al Qaeda–related captures, some
thought membership in al Qaeda a sufficient condition for detention, while others
argued that membership was necessary but not sufficient, and that some showing
of knowing conduct associated with violence was also required. Among those who
found membership sufficient or at least relevant to the analysis, moreover, there
was relatively little discussion of just what the indicia of membership in a non-State
actor like al Qaeda might be. None of the judges, finally, had occasion to address
the scenario in which a person was not a member of an AUMF-covered group but
had provided material support to one.
B. The Second Wave of Detention Criteria Caselaw: The Guantanamo Cases
The end of domestic-detention litigation did not mean that courts going forward
would have no further opportunity to consider these debates. The same questions
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of course arise in relation to the vastly more frequent scenario in which the military
has detained non-citizens captured and held overseas.
1. Contesting the Substantive Scope of Detention Authority in Boumediene
Between the opening of detention operations at Guantanamo in January 2002 and
the summer of 2004, the ability of non-citizens held there to obtain judicial review
via habeas corpus was sharply contested. That contest ended for a brief period in
June 2004, however, when the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush held that the federal
habeas corpus statute conferred jurisdiction as to the claims of the Guantanamo
detainees. Not long thereafter, Congress enacted the first of two statutes designed
in part to overturn the statutory holding in Rasul, thus reviving the debate over ju-
risdiction that stood between the Guantanamo detainees and judicial consider-
ation of any merits issues they might present—including arguments about the legal
boundaries of detention authority.150 Yet in the months before Congress acted, ha-
beas litigation had moved forward in federal court in Washington, D.C., with two
cases proceeding to the merits.
Ultimately, these cases would come together in the Supreme Court under the
name Boumediene v. Bush. At the district court level, however, they remained
quite distinct. One came before Judge Leon, who resolved the petition in the gov-
ernment’s favor without addressing the substantive scope of the government’s
detention authority.151 The other came before Judge Green, who took the con-
trary view.
In a January 2005 decision titled In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Judge Green
concluded that the detainees held at Guantanamo were entitled to the protections
of the Fifth Amendment notwithstanding their status as non-citizens captured and
held outside the United States.152 This of course raised constitutional questions re-
garding the actual process the detainees had been afforded. But it also raised a con-
stitutional question regarding the substantive scope of detention authority
asserted by the government in the following sense.153 One group of detainees in the
litigation had argued that the Fifth Amendment precludes detention “based solely
on . . . membership in anti-American organizations rather than on actual activities
supporting the use of violence or harm against the United States.”154 Judge Green
agreed, writing that it would violate due process if the government were to hold a
person “solely because of his contacts with individuals or organizations tied to ter-
rorism and not because of any terrorist activities that the detainee aided, abetted,
or undertook himself.”155 In that respect, Judge Green’s opinion was akin to the
view expressed by Judge Wilkinson in Al-Marri; for both judges, detention could
not be predicated on membership alone, but must include some showing of
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knowing involvement in violent activities (though not necessarily direct participa-
tion in violence).156
It would be some time before another judge would address the substantive
scope of detention authority in the context of a Guantanamo habeas claim. By the
time the decisions by Judges Leon and Green were before the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Congress had enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, which purported to
eliminate statutory habeas jurisdiction—thus reviving the pre-Rasul jurisdictional
debate, albeit with a twist. Instead of eliminating all judicial review, the DTA cre-
ated an exclusive mechanism pursuant to which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
could review individual detention decisions at Guantanamo in order to determine
whether the military’s screening system complied with the “Constitution and laws
of the United States” and whether the military had actually complied with its own
screening rules in a particular case. This model appeared to leave the D.C. Circuit
in a position to consider the legal boundaries of the government’s detention au-
thority, but at the same time the DTA appeared to eliminate the habeas review
system that had provided Judge Green the occasion for her ruling.
Several detainees—including many of the individuals involved in the cases be-
fore Judges Leon and Green—argued that this arrangement was unconstitutional,
reasoning that the Constitution required the existence of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion at Guantanamo and that the D.C. Circuit review alternative was not an ade-
quate substitute. That much is widely appreciated, as their arguments did
ultimately prevail in Boumediene. Many are not aware, however, that these litigants
simultaneously pressed the substantive question of who lawfully may be detained,
and that this question was briefed and argued to the Supreme Court alongside the
jurisdictional issue.
The lead petitioners in Boumediene did not focus their arguments on Judge
Green’s determination that the Due Process Clause required a conduct-based
rather than a membership-based test for detainability.157 Instead, they concen-
trated on LOAC-based arguments that would constrain the government’s deten-
tion authority irrespective of whether a particular detainee could claim Fifth
Amendment protections. Their argument began with the premise that LOAC de-
fined the outer boundaries of whatever detention authority the United States
had.158 Next, the petitioners argued that LOAC does not recognize combatant sta-
tus in relation to armed conflicts between States and non-State actors; in that set-
ting, they contended, everyone counts as a civilian.159
One might have expected them to stop at this point, echoing the view of Judge
Motz in the Al-Marri panel decision to the effect that civilians simply are not sub-
ject to military detention. But they did not do so. On the contrary, they conceded
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that some civilians could indeed be detained consistent with LOAC.160 But which
ones?
The petitioners invoked the “direct participation in hostilities” (DPH) test, ar-
guing that any civilian could be detained to the extent that he or she had engaged in
DPH.161 DPH is a LOAC principle associated with the question of who may be tar-
geted with lethal force, reflecting the notion that whereas a “combatant” may be
targeted at all times so long as not hors de combat, a “civilian” may never intention-
ally be targeted unless that person is engaged in DPH. DPH is not, in other words, a
concept traditionally associated with detention authority. Nonetheless, in the con-
text of a non-international armed conflict involving a clandestine network the
members of which sought to obscure their identity, the idea of using DPH as a sort-
ing standard had a certain appeal as a limiting principle for detention authority.
From this point of view, their argument was rather in the spirit of Judge Wilkin-
son’s effort to craft a more-tailored understanding of “combatant” for use in the
same setting, except that in this case the argument was framed as a description of
what LOAC already requires as a binding rule of international law in this
context.162
Even assuming the Supreme Court was amenable in principle to using the DPH
standard as the measure of detainability, a problem remained. Famously, the pre-
cise meaning of DPH is the subject of fierce and protracted disagreement.163
The petitioners would have to tread carefully in crafting their position on this
point. If they pushed for too narrow a definition, they might alienate those mem-
bers of the Court inclined to recognize a relatively broad amount of detention au-
thority. If they advanced too broad a conception, on the other hand, they might
confirm their own detainability. Ultimately, and perhaps surprisingly, they erred
on the side of a broad definition.
As an initial matter, they conceded that immediate personal involvement in
conventional battlefield-type actions counts as direct participation.164 That much
is common ground for most, if not all, participants in the larger DPH debate. They
did not stop there, however. They also endorsed the view that a person can be
deemed perpetually engaged in DPH—in effect, waiving the protections of civilian
status—insofar as he engages in DPH on a repeated basis (a position rather like the
“continuous combat function” theory of DPH advanced by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, among others).165 The petitioners added that this sta-
tus would extend to leadership figures in al Qaeda, moreover, and most remark-
ably of all they suggested it might even extend to those actual members of al Qaeda
who are subject to the group’s direction and control.166 In short, the petitioners
offered a test that would leave the government with a substantial amount of deten-
tion—and targeting—authority, while excluding those who at most provide
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support on a relatively independent basis to al Qaeda or the Taliban (presumably
the petitioners reasoned that the government at most could prove them to be in
the latter category).167
Notwithstanding this invitation, the Supreme Court in Boumediene ultimately
chose to say nothing at all about the question of detention standards, neither en-
dorsing nor rejecting Judge Green’s objection to membership-based detention or
the Boumediene petitioner’s DPH-based argument.168 All of this instead would be
left for the district courts to sort out in the coming wave of habeas litigation.
2. Contesting the Substantive Scope of Detention Authority after Boumediene
Much has occurred in the Guantanamo habeas litigation during the two and a half
years since the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene. The federal district court
in Washington, D.C. has resolved the merits in habeas cases involving forty indi-
vidual Guantanamo detainees, finding for the government in nineteen instances
and for the detainee in twenty-one.169 Many of these rulings have been or may yet
be appealed. Of the nineteen cases won by the government at the district court
level, the D.C. Circuit has reached the merits in five, affirming in four instances
and reversing and remanding for further consideration in one other.170 Of the
twenty-one cases won by the detainee at the district court level, the D.C. Circuit has
reached the merits in two, reversing with instructions to deny the writ in one in-
stance171 and reversing and remanding for further consideration in another.172
Many of these appellate decisions are themselves now the subjects of unresolved
petitions for certiorari, and so the circumstances remain in flux.173
In addition to all of this, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals very shortly after
Boumediene held that the government lacked authority to detain a group of seven-
teen Chinese Uighur detainees, because their alleged affiliation with the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement did not bring them within the scope of the AUMF.174
That ruling came under the auspices of the DTA, rather than the habeas corpus re-
view mandated weeks earlier by Boumediene,175 but the result in any event was a
defeat for the government.
For the most part, these decisions have turned on evidentiary issues. That is,
they turn on questions such as whether and to what extent to credit certain kinds of
evidence, and above all whether the collective impact of the government’s evidence
suffices in a particular case to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a de-
tainee is who the government claims him to be.176 But along the way, the judges
have had several occasions to grapple with the substantive-scope questions left
open by the combination of Hamdi, Padilla, Al-Marri and Boumediene. Perhaps
predictably, they have disagreed on several key points.
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The first section below surveys a handful of conflicting cases considering
whether future dangerousness should be treated as a necessary condition for de-
tention. For the time being at least, the answer to that question is no. The next sec-
tion takes up a line of cases illustrating a strong consensus to the effect that
membership counts as a sufficient condition for detention, but also revealing con-
siderable disagreement both as to the actual meaning of membership and whether
support independent of membership can serve as an alternative sufficient
condition.
a. Rejecting Personal Dangerousness as a Necessary Condition. On April 15, 2009,
Judge Ellen Huvelle held in Basardh v. Obama that the government may not con-
tinue to hold anyone in custody, regardless of whether he or she was a member or
supporter of a relevant group at the time of capture, where the person is not likely
to “rejoin the enemy” if released.177 The September 18, 2001 AUMF “defines the
Executive’s detention authority in plain and unambiguous terms,” she asserted,
and “does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is neces-
sary to prevent those individuals from rejoining the battle . . . .”178 Reasoning that
Basardh had no prospect of rejoining any enemy of the United States as a result of
“widespread public disclosure” of his cooperation with American interrogators,
Judge Huvelle concluded that he must be released.179
This approach amounts to the imposition of a particular kind of “future danger-
ousness” condition, above and beyond whatever criteria might be required to jus-
tify detention in the first instance. It did not prove popular, however, among other
judges. Two district judges explicitly rejected this aspect of Basardh,180 and more
significantly the D.C. Circuit eventually did the same.181 For the time being, then,
this aspect of the substantive-scope issue has been settled.
b. Contesting Membership and Support as Sufficient Conditions. The bulk of
the post-Boumediene cases dealing with the substantive-scope question have fo-
cused on the role of membership and independent support as sufficient conditions
for detention. Notwithstanding earlier claims to the contrary by Judge Green in In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases and Judge Wilkinson in Al-Marri, these opinions reflect
widespread agreement among the judges that associational status alone—i.e.,
membership in an AUMF-covered group—can serve as a sufficient condition to jus-
tify detention. Consensus breaks down, however, when it comes to fleshing out the
meaning of membership, and likewise when it comes to determining whether in-
dependent support—i.e., the provision of material support to an AUMF-covered
group by a non-member—can serve as an alternative sufficient condition.
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These issues arose initially before Judge Leon, presiding over the merits hearing
for the Boumediene petitioners themselves on remand from their Supreme Court
victory.182 In October 2008, he issued an opinion characterizing both the petition-
ers and the government as having urged him to “draft” his own preferred legal
standard regarding the boundaries of detention authority.183 This he refused to do,
arguing that his role instead was merely to determine whether the administration’s
position was consistent with a pair of domestic legal considerations: the AUMF, and
any further authority the President might have under the “war powers” of Article II
of the Constitution.184 Without substantial elaboration, Judge Leon concluded
that the government’s two-track standard was compatible with both.185
There things stood when the Obama administration came into office in early
2009. On the second day of his administration, President Obama initiated a major
review of detention policy by giving an interagency task force six months to assess
the full range of options associated with the capture, detention, trial and disposi-
tion of persons in the context of combat and counterterrorism operations.186 But
litigation deadlines pay no respect to plans for carefully paced policy deliberations,
particularly not when years of jurisdictional litigation precedes the merits. Long
before the mid-2009 deadline for completion of the interagency review, the admin-
istration was obliged to make clear not only whether it intended to defend its au-
thority to employ military detention without criminal charge at Guantanamo, but
also what substantive detention standard it believed it had a right to invoke.
It did this on March 13, 2009, when the Justice Department’s Civil Division filed
a brief before Judge Bates in the Hamlily litigation. To the surprise of some, the
Obama administration continued to assert authority to detain without charge, and
to do so pursuant to a standard not much different from the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal standard of the Bush administration. To be sure, it eschewed
the baggage-laden nomenclature of “unlawful enemy combatant” in favor of an
acronym-less, generic reference to those persons subject to detention pursuant to
the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. And it also ex-
pressly embraced the relevance of LOAC for purposes of defining the particulars of
that authority. Those particulars turned out to be much the same as before, however,
including preservation of the two-track approach encompassing either members or
supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated groups. The only substantive dif-
ference was the qualification—or clarification—that independent support must be
“substantial” in order to trigger eligibility for detention, thus eliminating any argu-
ment that de minimis support might suffice to support detention.
Before Judge Bates had the chance to address the merits of the revised position
in Hamlily, Judge Walton did so in Gherebi v. Obama.187 As an initial matter, Judge
Walton rejected the argument that LOAC provides no detention authority at all
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outside of international armed conflict, and that the AUMF should be construed
accordingly.188 LOAC, he argued, is best viewed as a restraining body of law rather
than an authorizing body of law.189 Thus, though it is true that Common Article 3
has no express language affirmatively authorizing detention, this merely showed
that LOAC imposes no restraints on who lawfully may be detained in non-
international armed conflict.
Any restraints instead must come from some other body of law, including the
AUMF itself. In Judge Walton’s view, however, the AUMF most certainly did con-
fer at least some detention authority. “[W]henever the President can lawfully exer-
cise military force, so, too, can he incapacitate the enemy force through detention
rather than death.”190
That position, of course, was not enough to settle the legal boundaries of
AUMF-based detention authority. Judge Walton next had to confront the question
of who counts as the “enemy force” when you are not contending with another
State’s army. Borrowing from the approach of the petitioners in Boumediene, the
detainee in Gherebi urged Judge Walton to adopt DPH as the measure of
detainability.191 But he did not advocate the same conception of DPH as had the
Boumediene petitioners. Specifically, he rejected the notion that the protections of
civilian status might be waived on a sustained basis through continuous participa-
tion in hostilities, thus eliminating the need to determine whether a person was en-
gaging in DPH at a precise point in time.192 Furthermore, the petitioner in Gherebi
added that it would not be enough just to show that a person had engaged in DPH;
in addition, he argued, the person must also have been “part of an organized armed
force” rather than some independent actor.193
In the end Judge Walton rejected the invitation to adopt one or another ver-
sion of the DPH standard as a necessary condition for detainability—though he
did not refrain from stating in dicta that the continuous-combat-function con-
ception of DPH “while perhaps not quite broad enough, is a step toward the right
answer,” and that if he were to accept the DPH standard he would construe it to
cover “all members of the armed forces of the enemy . . . at all times for the dura-
tion of hostilities.”194
He did agree, however, that membership in an organized armed force is a neces-
sary condition for detention authority—indeed, he concluded that it was a suffi-
cient condition as well.195 His argument in support of this conclusion turned on
the notion that the combatant category did indeed exist in non-international
armed conflict.196 Again noting his view that LOAC is merely restrictive in nature,
and hence that silence on a point does not deprive a State of the power to act in a
particular way, Judge Walton explained that the silence of Common Article 3 with
respect to the existence of a “combatant category” did not mean that no such
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category could be recognized in the non-international armed conflict setting.197
Explicitly equating targeting and detention authority, he asserted that the mem-
bers of the enemy armed force can be attacked at any time in non-international
armed conflict “and, incident to that attack, detained at any time.”198
In recognizing the existence of a category of detainable combatants in the non-
international conflict setting, Judge Walton’s opinion in Gherebi was contrary to
the views expressed by the Second Circuit in Padilla and Judge Motz in Al-Marri.
By accepting that membership alone might establish this ground for detention, his
opinion was contrary to Judge Green’s in the In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases
(though, to be fair, Judge Green’s position against association status as a permissi-
ble detention predicate rested on the premise that the detainee had a Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process right to invoke). And to the extent his opinion rejected the need
to show a detainee had personally had involvement in hostile conduct, it seemed
contrary as well to the views expressed by Judges Williams and Wilkinson in the
Fourth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Al-Marri. It was most akin, if anything, to
Judge Mukasey’s original Padilla opinion, and perhaps also to the concurrence of
Judge Traxler in Al-Marri.
In any event, Judge Walton’s approach at first blush appeared to be a government-
friendly one, insofar as it demanded only a showing of associational status. But
whether this was in fact a flexible or narrow standard really depends on how one
defines “membership” and “armed force”—concepts with relatively clear meaning
in a conventional armed conflict between the armies of States, perhaps, but most
certainly not in the context of conflict with a clandestine non-State network with
indeterminate organizational conceptions.
As to this question, Judge Walton turned explicitly to LOAC, stating that the
“criteria” set forth in GPW, Article 4 and Additional Protocol I, Article 43 consti-
tute “templates from which the court can glean certain characteristics” of an
“armed force.”199 This was a challenging approach, to say the least, because if there
is anything that Articles 4 and 43 emphasize as criteria for recognition as an armed
force, it is adherence to LOAC—and whatever else one might say about al Qaeda
and the Taliban, they neither comport their conduct with LOAC nor make any
pretense of doing so. Taken literally, then, Judge Walton’s reference to the criteria
in these provisions would produce precious little in the way of combatant deten-
tion authority in this particular context. But Judge Walton’s opinion did not high-
light the LOAC-adherence language in these articles. Instead, he highlighted their
implicit emphasis on the existence of a hierarchical command structure.200 Treat-
ing formal organizational structure as the hallmark of an armed force whose mem-
bers might constitute detainable (and targetable) combatants, Judge Walton then
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concluded that the ultimate inquiry is whether the person in question had “some
sort of ‘structured’ role in the ‘hierarchy’ of the enemy force.”201
Judge Walton did seem sensitive to the difficulties inherent in mapping that
model onto the context of decentralized networks such as al Qaeda, emphasiz-
ing that one must not be too rigid in looking for formal proof that a person oc-
cupied such a position.202 He noted that there usually will not be membership
cards or uniforms.203 The “structured role” test, he explained, may turn instead
on a particular functional inquiry: did the person “receive[] and execute[] or-
ders” from the “command structure”?204
But there was a further qualification. Judge Walton explained that it is not
enough that a person was part of the chain of command of the organization-as-a-
whole. Rather, the person must be part of the specific chain of command associated
with “the enemy force’s combat apparatus.”205 To be sure, Judge Walton was trying
to make the point that even a logistics officer for al Qaeda could be detained if part
of al Qaeda’s military chain of command.206 And he did also explicitly recognize
that a person who at one point in time was performing a non-military function
may well be subject to orders to shift to a military function after all, and hence
should not be treated as a non-combatant.207 Nonetheless, this approach did nec-
essarily embrace the notion of distinct “military” and “civilian” wings in such
groups, with the personnel of the latter at least sometimes lying beyond the reach of
the AUMF for any purpose, including not just detention authority but also the
authority to target with lethal force.
In this way, Judge Walton’s opinion in Gherebi at least partially supported the
government’s assertion that the AUMF conferred authority to detain the members
of groups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban. As for the government’s claim that the
AUMF also conferred authority to detain independent supporters of such groups,
however, Judge Walton was less accommodating. He did not directly reject that
claim. But he did insist that any support-based detention must comply with the
“structured role” test described above, which effectively folded the support inquiry
into the membership standard after all.208 Put simply, no purely independent sup-
porter could be detained under that test (or, presumably, targeted with lethal
force). A contrary reading, Judge Walton asserted, would cause the AUMF to con-
flict with LOAC, and he was unwilling to impute such a reading to the statute ab-
sent a clearer showing of legislative intent to accomplish such an end.209 In this
way, Judge Walton broke with the more accommodating approach of Judge Leon.
Obviously Judge Walton’s approach embraces the relevance of LOAC and the
premise that the United States in at last some current settings is involved in non-
international armed conflict—and he offers a highly specific interpretation of what
LOAC has to say about who may be detained (or targeted) as a result. Indeed,
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driving home the point that his reasoning applied as much to targeting as to deten-
tion, he routinely cross-references targeting authority as turning on the exact same
standards.
Just a few weeks after Judge Walton’s opinion in Gherebi, Judge Bates issued his
ruling in Hamlily.210 For the most part, his analysis followed Judge Walton’s. He
agreed, for example, that LOAC permitted detention based on membership status
even in the non-international conflict setting, notwithstanding the lack of affirma-
tive treaty language to that effect.211 And he agreed, too, that in this context “mem-
bership” boils down to whether the individual “receives and executes orders or
directions” as part of an AUMF-covered group’s command structure.212 Unlike
Judge Walton, however, he did not distinguish between the military and non-military
wings of an organization, and thus did not restrict eligibility to persons subject to a
military-specific chain of command.213 Hamlily, in other words, appears more akin
to the Mukasey opinion in Padilla and, perhaps, the Judge Traxler opinion in Al-
Marri.
Whether Judges Walton and Bates differ with respect to non-members who
provide substantial support to AUMF-covered groups is less clear. On one hand,
Judge Bates concluded that LOAC simply does not permit military detention of
such a person (though like all the other judges to address this question, he did not
address the potential relevance of the security internment option that would be
available in such circumstances in the event of international armed conflict).214 On
the other hand, he noted that membership in organizations such as al Qaeda may
be more of a functional than a formal concept, and that conduct that one might de-
scribe as independent support could well be conceived instead as evidence of func-
tional membership in some instances.215 That said, even a functional member must
still be shown to be part of the group’s chain of command in order to be detained
under the Hamlily model; truly independent supporters may not be detained no
matter how important their aid might be to the group.216
Gherebi and Hamlily thus are best as consistent on the point that non-members
may not be detained, and consistent as well on the point that membership ulti-
mately turns on participation in a chain of command. They appear to differ, how-
ever, with respect to whether detention authority is limited to the “military” chain
of command within an organization—though the magnitude of that difference
very much depends on how strictly one defines “military” in this context.
Adding to the confusion, other district judges subsequently disagreed with one
another regarding whether there is a genuine difference between Gherebi and
Hamlily. Judge Hogan, for example, has argued that there is not a substantial dif-
ference.217 Judge Kessler, on the other hand, states that there is, and that she prefers
the Gherebi approach.218 Meanwhile, Judge Urbina in Hatim v. Obama articulated
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an understanding of the chain-of-command test that very likely differs from what
either Judge Walton or Judge Bates had in mind.219
In Hatim, Judge Urbina stated that he adopts the Hamlily standard, including
the notion that detention authority turns on whether the person in question occu-
pied a role within a relevant group’s chain of command.220 According to Hatim,
however, merely notional status within a chain of command was not enough; one
must have actually obeyed specific orders in the past in order to be a member in
this sense, and hence to be detainable.221 Thus, according to Judge Urbina, it was
not enough for the government to prove that a person knowingly attended an al
Qaeda training camp and that the individual believed that in doing so he or she
had effectively joined al Qaeda.222 It may be that Judges Bates and Walton, or other
judges following the Gherebi and Hamlily standards, might interpret the chain-of-
command test in the same fashion. It seems equally if not more likely, however,
that they would not.
In any event, the nuanced disagreement among Judges Walton, Bates and Urbina,
if disagreement there truly was, became moot once the chain-of-command question
came before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In a series of cases in 2010, the Cir-
cuit has expressly rejected the proposition that one must be part of any chain of
command—let alone that of the military wing of an organization—in order to
qualify as a member subject to military detention under the AUMF.
The Circuit first made this point in Al-Bihani v. Obama,223 in January 2010. In
that case, a divided panel offered a number of important observations regarding
the lawful scope of detention authority. To begin with, the majority opinion by
Judges Kavanaugh and Brown broke sharply with most of the prior detention cases
by concluding that LOAC simply has no bearing on the question of who lawfully
may be detained without criminal charge in this setting.224 That is to say, Al-Bihani
broke new ground in the habeas litigation by holding that only domestic law
sources should be considered in the course of determining the legal bounds of
detention authority.
Absent reference to LOAC, however, how was the broad language of the AUMF
to be construed? As noted, the AUMF itself provides some guidance at the group
level, but almost no guidance at all at the individual level. Other domestic law
sources would be needed, therefore, in order to address what conduct or status suf-
ficed to link a person to an AUMF-covered group for detention purposes. And ac-
cording to the majority in Al-Bihani, the personal jurisdiction provisions found in
the MCA 2006 and MCA 2009 provided the necessary guidance.225
Those provisions clearly stated that military commissions may entertain pro-
ceedings against non-citizens who are members of AUMF-covered groups and also
those who are non-members but who nonetheless provide support to such groups.
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Asserting that a person subject to military commission prosecution under the two
MCAs a fortiori would be subject to detention under the AUMF, the panel majority
in Al-Bihani concluded that independent support thus constitutes a sufficient con-
dition for detention separate and apart from proof of membership in an AUMF-
covered group.226
As for the meaning of membership, the panel majority rejected the view ad-
vanced by Judge Walton in Gherebi, Judge Bates in Hamlily and Judge Urbina in
Hatim to the effect that proof of membership requires some kind of participation
in a group’s chain of command.227 But if the chain-of-command test did not define
membership, what criteria would? Here the opinion was less clear, except as to two
remarkable points. First, Al-Bihani asserted that a person should be deemed a
member and hence subject to detention in the event that he attended a training
camp sponsored by an AUMF-covered group.228 Second, it raised the possibility
that merely having stayed at a guesthouse associated with an AUMF-covered
group’s recruitment process might also constitute adequate evidence of member-
ship and detainability.229 These statements were dicta and hence not binding on
the district court, yet they certainly signaled a broad conception of membership—
arguably broader than anything previously endorsed in the habeas litigation, either
before Boumediene or since.
Subsequent decisions by the Circuit largely reinforced Al-Bihani. To be sure,
some of Al-Bihani’s punch was diluted by the fact that a majority of the active
judges of the Circuit declared the panel’s views about the irrelevance of interna-
tional law to be mere dicta, in the course of “denying” en banc review.230 The dicta-
fication of that aspect of the panel opinion did not necessarily undermine the sup-
port and membership aspects of the earlier decision, however, as the panel had also
observed that it found “Al-Bihani’s reading of international law to be unpersua-
sive.”231 More significantly, subsequent Circuit decisions have reinforced key as-
pects of the Al-Bihani panel opinion.
First, the unanimous opinion in Awad v. Obama232—by Chief Judge Sentelle
and Judges Tatel and Garland—restated the point that one need not be part of a
chain of command in order to be detainable.233 This would be useful evidence of
membership, of course, but membership also could be shown by proof that a per-
son self-identified as part of an AUMF-covered group or was captured in circum-
stances amounting to fighting on behalf of such a group.234 And in Barhoumi v.
Obama,235 Judges Tatel, Ginsburg and Kavanaugh joined to state once again that
the chain-of-command test is not a necessary condition for detention, though it
happened to be satisfied in that case and did count as a sufficient condition.236
Neither Awad nor Barhoumi provided the D.C. Circuit with an opportunity to re-
visit or refine Al-Bihani’s favorable treatment of independent support as a distinct
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ground for detention. Many thought that the next decision—Bensayah v. Obama—
would do so. Bensayah himself was the last of the original Boumediene petitioners,
the only one whom Judge Leon found was subject to detention after remand from
the Supreme Court. And as noted above, Judge Leon had expressly approved reli-
ance on independent support as a ground for detention in that case. Indeed, he had
found Bensayah subject to detention not for being an al Qaeda member, but in-
stead for having provided support to al Qaeda (in the form of facilitating the travel
of would-be fighters to Afghanistan). A casual observer might have assumed,
therefore, that the appeal would oblige the D.C. Circuit to give further consider-
ation to the sufficiency of independent support as a detention ground.
A more rigorous observer, on the other hand, would anticipate that the Circuit’s
decision would focus on the membership ground instead. Several months earlier,
Charlie Savage of the New York Times had reported the existence of a “pro-
nounced” disagreement among “top lawyers in the State Department and the Pen-
tagon,” as well as the Justice Department and other agencies, with respect to “how
broadly to define the types of terrorism suspects who may be detained without trial
as wartime prisoners.”237 According to Savage’s account, the debate arose initially
when the government was obliged to develop its revised detention position in
Hamlily.238 As noted above, the government ultimately chose to make some
changes to its position, but did not abandon the claim that it had authority to de-
tain both members and non-member supporters of AUMF-covered groups. This
did not end the internal debate, however, but instead merely delayed it until such
time that the administration might be faced with the choice of whether to defend a
specific case on independent support grounds.239
The need to develop a position on appeal in the Bensayah litigation, Savage
wrote, provided just such an occasion:
The arguments over the case forced onto the table discussion of lingering discontent at
the State Department over one aspect of the Obama position on detention. There was
broad agreement that the law of armed conflict allowed the United States to detain as
wartime prisoners anyone who was actually a part of Al Qaeda, as well as nonmembers
who took positions alongside the enemy force and helped it. But some criticized the
notion that the United States could also consider mere supporters, arrested far away, to
be just as detainable without trial as enemy fighters.240
Assuming the accuracy of this account, then, the specific dispute involved the con-
junction of the independent support ground with the use of detention authority
for captures away from the conventional battlefield. Savage reported that the State
Department’s newly arrived Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, championed the view “that
there was no support in the laws of war” for the claim of detention authority in that
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circumstance, while the Defense Department’s General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, dis-
agreed.241 Savage indicates that the question was then put to the Justice Depart-
ment’s Office of Legal Counsel, which eventually produced an equivocal
memorandum “stating that while the Office of Legal Counsel had found no prece-
dents justifying the detention of mere supporters of Al Qaeda who were picked up far
away from enemy forces, it was not prepared to state any definitive conclusion.”242
Nonetheless, a position was needed for the Bensayah appeal.243 According to
Savage’s account, the solution was to “try to avoid that hard question” by
“chang[ing] the subject” in Bensayah. Rather than defend the decision below on
the ground relied upon by Judge Leon—i.e., that Bensayah could be detained be-
cause he provided support to al Qaeda—the government would instead seek
affirmance on the ground that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda.244
And thus the Justice Department’s Civil Division came to make a most unusual fil-
ing on the eve of oral argument in the case, explaining to the court in a brief letter
that the “Government’s position is that this case is best analyzed in terms of
whether Bensayah was functionally ‘part of’ al Qaida, and that the district court’s
judgment can and should be affirmed solely on that ground.”245 In an indication
that the internal debate had not yet been resolved, however, the letter added that
the Government is not foreclosing its right to argue in appropriate cases that the
AUMF, as informed by the laws of war, permits detaining some persons based on the
substantial support they provide to enemy forces, even though such persons are not
themselves “part of” those forces. The Government continues to defend the lawfulness
of detaining certain individuals who provide substantial support to, but are not part of,
al Qaida or the Taliban.246
At the time he wrote, Savage did not know how this strategy would play out with
the D.C. Circuit. Nonetheless, he concluded his account with a perceptive observa-
tion regarding the larger significance of the issue: “The outcome of the yearlong de-
bate could reverberate through national security policies, ranging from the
number of people the United States ultimately detains to decisions about who may
be lawfully selected for killing using drones.”247
Some nine months later, in late June 2010, the Circuit reversed in Bensayah v.
Obama.248 But it is far from clear that the government’s decision not to advance
the independent support argument caused that outcome, nor that geographic
constraints entered into the analysis. In addition to limiting its legal theory on ap-
peal, the government also had decided not to continue to rely on certain
inculpatory statements that had been made by another detainee. The latter move
appeared to be the decisive one. The panel held that the remaining evidence did
not suffice to prove that Bensayah had engaged in the recruiting and logistical
150
Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:16 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
support activities that the government had alleged, and hence that the govern-
ment had failed to show that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda. By
the same token, presumably, this same body of evidence would not have sufficed
even if the government had advanced its original independent support theory. In
any event, the litigation continues; the Circuit remanded the case not with orders
to grant Bensayah’s petition, but rather for Judge Leon to reconsider the merits,
including any new evidence of functional membership that the government might
put forward.
Thus we are left with an unusual state of affairs. After the majority of the district
judges to consider the question rejected the proposition that the government law-
fully may assert authority to detain independent supporters of AUMF-covered
groups, the Circuit took the contrary view. In the meantime, however, the execu-
tive branch itself appears to have become internally divided on the question, and
for the moment appears disinclined to take advantage of the Circuit’s position on
the matter—at least where the independent support occurs in a place geographi-
cally remote from a conventional battlefield.
The Circuit has not had an opportunity to weigh in on the independent support
question since Al-Bihani and Bensayah. The next two circuit opinions instead
touched lightly on other aspects of the substantive-scope issue. Shortly after
Bensayah, for example, the Circuit in Al Odah v. Obama affirmed the detention of
an individual on membership grounds.249 The most notable aspect of the case, for
present purposes, was the fact that the opinion by Chief Judge Sentelle and Judges
Rogers and Garland restated Al-Bihani’s suggestion that training camp attendance
alone might well be sufficient to make out the case for detention on membership
grounds. Then, two weeks later, Judges Randolph, Henderson and Kavanaugh in
Al Adahi v. Obama found that evidence of a detainee’s attendance at a training
camp and guesthouse constituted powerful evidence of functional membership,
and sharply criticized a district judge for suggesting otherwise.250
In contrast, the Circuit has had a chance since Bensayah to comment—albeit
only implicitly—on the question of geographic constraints at least in the context of
membership-based detention. In Salahi v. Obama, in November 2010, a circuit
panel dealt with a Mauritanian detainee whom the government alleged to be an al
Qaeda member but who was not captured in Afghanistan nor alleged to have been
involved in combat in or near Afghanistan (at least not after the early 1990s).251
The appellate panel expressed no concerns about the theoretical assertion of deten-
tion authority in such circumstances, but instead remanded so that the district
court could reweigh the evidence under a different standard. Implicit rejection of
geographic constraints in the membership setting, of course, does not compel the
same with respect to detention based solely on independent support.
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c. That Which Is Now Clear and That Which Remains Contested. As a result of
the foregoing string of D.C. Circuit decisions, an important aspect of the govern-
ment’s detention authority appears settled, at least at a high level of generality and at
least for the moment. Specifically, the Circuit has developed a broad consensus to the
effect that membership in an AUMF-covered group is a sufficient condition for de-
tention. But other questions remain. What precisely counts as membership in a clan-
destine, diffused network such as al Qaeda? Does independent support provide an
alternative ground for detention? Does the location of a person’s capture or underly-
ing activities matter under either the membership or support criteria?
With respect to the detailed meaning of membership, some things have been
made clear while others remain uncertain—perhaps inevitably so. The cases do es-
tablish that proof of participation in a formal chain of command would be suffi-
cient but is not necessary to demonstrate membership. They are relatively clear,
moreover, that training camp participation is highly significant to prove member-
ship, if not a sufficient condition to do so on its own, and the cases further suggest,
albeit with less force, that the same may be true for guesthouse attendance in at
least some contexts. Absent those elements, however, it remains unclear which
forms of involvement with the affairs of an AUMF-covered group distinguish
those who can be detained from those who cannot. In that circumstance, the ques-
tion would seem to depend upon the gestalt impression conveyed by the totality of
the circumstances, measured against unspecified—and potentially inconsistent—
metrics of affiliation held by particular judges. Consider, in that regard, the way in
which Judge Bates summarized the task in a recent, post-Al-Bihani opinion:
“[T]here are no settled criteria” for determining who is “part of” the Taliban, al-Qaida,
or an associated force. “That determination must be made on a case-by-case basis
by using a functional rather than formal approach and by focusing on the actions of
the individual in relation to the organization.” The Court must consider the totality of
the evidence to assess the individual’s relationship with the organization. But being
“part of” the Taliban, al-Qaida, or an associated force requires “some level of knowl-
edge or intent.”252
Even when the training camp or guesthouse elements are present, moreover, it
is not clear that they will always suffice. Indeed, one of the first district court
opinions to emerge against the backdrop of the Circuit’s interventions directly
challenged the relevance of guesthouse attendance, arguing that the connotations
of guesthouse attendance vary depending on the house in question and that resi-
dence at the guesthouse in that particular case was not necessarily inculpatory.253
On the other hand, another recent district court opinion gives substantial weight
to the fact that a detainee attended a Taliban-controlled guesthouse, particularly
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when viewed in combination with evidence that a Taliban recruiter gave the
man money, a passport and a ticket for air travel, and that the man twice went
near to the front lines and received a weapon from a person who likely was a
Taliban member.254
Note that similar disagreements could yet emerge in connection with the train-
ing camp variable. Like guesthouses, training camps can vary in terms of their
provenance and connotations. Some clearly were or are operated by al Qaeda or
the Taliban, but not all were; fact patterns may arise that raise difficult questions of
attribution and inference.255 Of course, it may be that no further refinement of the
variables defining membership is possible in this setting, and that the status quo
represents the realistic maximum when it comes to defining this criterion (though
it should at least be possible to clarify the geographic question).
In any event, the status quo certainly has not settled the separate question of
whether detention may be predicated on a showing of independent support to an
AUMF-covered group—nor whether, if such a criterion is legitimate, it must be
limited to persons who were captured or acted in certain geographic locations, or
for that matter whether it must be confined to only certain types of support or to
support rendered with certain specific mental states.
Finally, the question of geography continues to loom large in the substantive-
scope debate. Recent litigation associated with alleged plans to conduct a targeted
killing of an American citizen in Yemen, on the ground that the individual was an
operational leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has sharpened the debate
as to whether LOAC’s field of application is strictly limited to geographically de-
fined battlefields of a conventional nature or if, instead, any LOAC-related au-
thority to use force attaches to at least some enemy-affiliated personnel wherever
they may travel (or, more narrowly, to such persons when they are located in de-
nied or ungoverned areas).256 The question is at least as pertinent in the detention
context. As noted above, at least two of the Guantanamo habeas cases thus far—
Bensayah and Salahi—involved detainees with remote or no linkages to any tradi-
tional battlefield, and the judges in those instances expressed no particular con-
cerns on that point—though they did not expressly address the issue. The earlier
experience of the Al-Marri litigation, meanwhile, suggests there may yet be judi-
cial disagreement on the point.
Overarching all these questions, finally, is the lingering disagreement regarding
which bodies of law actually govern. The Al-Bihani panel opinion sought to resolve
this dispute by forbidding reference to LOAC and other forms of international law.
Though the Circuit majority subsequently neutered that claim by declaring it to be
dicta, it did not go so far as to issue a contrary holding to the effect that any such
body of law does actually apply. In any event, as Part I illustrated, determining that
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a particular body of law applies does not ensure agreement as to what that body of
law requires when it comes to selecting and calibrating the variables that combine
to form the individualized detention standard.
III. The Significance of the Emerging Law Governing Detention Criteria
In the wake of this descriptive account, several questions arise. First, does it actually
matter that the habeas process has not yet resolved the disagreements and unan-
swered questions noted in Part II? Second, if this does matter, is it preferable to
simply be patient, leaving the matter in judicial hands, or instead should Congress
intervene with legislation?
A. Do the Disagreement and Uncertainty Matter?
The persistence of disagreement and unresolved questions regarding the substantive-
scope issue in the habeas litigation is problematic on many levels. First, the
uncertainty and disagreement may prove significant with respect to the many as-
yet-undecided Guantanamo habeas cases. True, the vast majority of the Guan-
tanamo habeas cases to this point have turned on other issues—above all, ques-
tions of evidentiary sufficiency. Only Basardh, in which Judge Huvelle made an
ill-fated attempt to limit detention authority to circumstances in which a person
was likely to cause harm if released, clearly turned on an issue involving the scope
of detention authority that the judge in question was prepared to recognize. But
much more habeas litigation is to come, and hence this question may yet prove
dispositive for some Guantanamo detainees. No one can say for sure precisely
how many cases may yet proceed to the merits, but it seems likely that we are not
yet halfway through. We cannot know at this point whether the substantive-scope
question will remain marginal to the merits. If it does become central in these
future cases, the continuing uncertainty surrounding the question is problematic
from both the detainee and the government perspectives.
Second, the pool of habeas cases eventually may encompass more than the
Guantanamo detainees. Whether this will come to pass most likely depends, how-
ever, on whether the United States resumes the practice of taking long-term cus-
tody of individuals captured outside of States in which conventional armed
conflict is occurring. This issue has been tested to some extent in the context of Af-
ghanistan. Attorneys representing a group of US military detainees in Afghanistan
have been attempting for several years now to establish habeas jurisdiction over
detention operations there. They met with mixed success at the district court level,
with Judge Bates holding that non-Afghans may pursue habeas relief if captured
outside of Afghanistan and brought there for detention by the United States,
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whereas none of those actually captured in Afghanistan could do so. 257 A D.C. Cir-
cuit panel subsequently reversed on the first point only, explaining that “all of the
attributes of a facility exposed to the vagaries of war are present in Bagram” and
that the US detention facility in Afghanistan (then at Bagram, today in Parwan) is
in “territory under neither the de facto nor de jure sovereignty of the United States
and within the territory of another de jure sovereign.”258 The court did not, how-
ever, close the door to habeas jurisdiction entirely. The panel went out of its way to
observe that there was no evidence in this case that the detainees had been brought
into Afghanistan in order to evade judicial review, as their transfer occurred long
before Boumediene rendered Guantanamo subject to judicial review.259 The panel
warned that if “such manipulation by the Executive” were proven in a future case,
the outcome might be different.260 In the course of remanding that case to Judge
Bates for further proceedings, moreover, the Circuit noted that it might take a dif-
ferent view even in that very case should new evidence emerge regarding the nature
of US detention operations in Afghanistan.
Given that the United States is actively engaged in a process meant to culminate
in the transfer of control over its long-term detention operations in Afghanistan to
the Afghan government (just as we already have transferred control of our deten-
tion operations in Iraq to the government there), and absent evidence that the
United States is still in the business of capturing persons elsewhere and bringing
them to Afghanistan for purposes of long-term detention, it must be said that the
prospects for an extension of habeas to Afghanistan are increasingly slim notwith-
standing these caveats. The more significant lesson from the Afghan habeas litiga-
tion, therefore, is that courts going forward likely would be receptive to an
extension of habeas to any location should the United States in the future resume
the practice of taking and maintaining military custody of individuals captured
outside of a traditional battlefield context. It may be that the United States will
avoid that practice in the future, substituting some combination of rendition, host-
nation detention,261 targeted killing, surveillance, prosecution or inaction in its
place. But if the practice of long-term detention for non-battlefield capture re-
emerges, so too will the questions surrounding habeas jurisdiction.
Even if habeas jurisdiction remains limited to Guantanamo, however, there are
still other reasons to believe the uncertainty associated with the substantive-scope
jurisprudence to be problematic. Most significantly, the struggle over who may be
held matters not only for those detainees who already have or may one day receive
the right to seek habeas review but also for any detention operations that ultimately
depend upon the same underlying legal authority—i.e., the AUMF. That is to say,
if judges determine in the habeas setting that the AUMF extends only to certain
groups or fact patterns, commanders and policymakers must take that judgment
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into account whenever acting under that same authority—whether subject to ha-
beas review or not. In practical terms, this means that the habeas jurisprudence can
and presumably will impact all AUMF-based detention operations—including
specifically all detention operations in Afghanistan—even though very few
detentions beyond Guantanamo are or likely ever will be subject to direct habeas
review. Civilian government lawyers advising policymakers, and military judge ad-
vocates advising commanders in the field, have an obligation to take account of
this caselaw in the course of devising policy and procedure regarding who may be
detained prospectively and what standard should be employed when carrying out
screening of detainees post-capture. In this way, the detention-scope jurispru-
dence arising out of Guantanamo could come to impact a far greater number of de-
tainees. Unfortunately, policymakers and commanders at the moment lack clarity
regarding the boundaries of their authority, yet have little choice but to proceed in
the shadow of this uncertainty.
Making matters worse, spillover effects from the Guantanamo habeas might not
be limited to detention operations. The effects may extend to AUMF-based target-
ing decisions as well. That is to say, the detention-scope debate may overhang the
decision to kill under color of the AUMF as much it overhangs the decision to de-
tain under that authority.
The point is not an immediately obvious one; the power to kill and the power to
detain are by no means coextensive. But they need not be coextensive in order for
the Guantanamo habeas litigation to impact the legal bounds of targeting authority
elsewhere. Again, the AUMF is the transmission mechanism. Say that in the course
of the habeas litigation, courts ultimately determine that the AUMF must be con-
strued to apply only to sworn members of al Qaeda and the Taliban who have re-
ceived military-style training. Assume further that a commander subsequently
desires to launch a missile from a drone into the window of a car being driven in
Yemen by a local man whom he believes to act as a fund-raiser for al Qaeda—but
whom he also knows has not sworn an oath to al Qaeda or attended any training
camps. The strike on its face would not be an exercise of force supported by the
AUMF, whatever its consistency with LOAC or IHRL.
It may be that the strike could yet be justified, but the important point for pres-
ent purposes is that the issue at the very least would be clouded by the narrowing
construction of the AUMF produced via the habeas litigation. Thus military opera-
tions not directly subject to judicial review262 nonetheless may be impacted indi-
rectly by the development of detention-scope jurisprudence. And as in the
detention context, the dynamic matters not so much because it exists, but rather
because it is transmitting uncertainty.
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Finally, the habeas litigation may also generate spillover effects by virtue of the
fact that the judges in the course of resolving the detention-scope issue have en-
gaged with concepts that are both contested and likely to arise in future, unrelated
contexts involving military force. This is most obviously the case with respect to the
episodes in which judges have grappled with the meaning of “direct participation
in hostilities” in an effort to clarify the scope of the government’s detention
authority. The merits of referencing DPH for this purpose are considered above.
For now, the important point is that when courts do make use of DPH in this way,
they may be obliged to define this deeply contested concept. And once they do this,
their opinion will matter at least to an extent in any subsequent context in which
that LOAC concept matters—without regard to whether that subsequent context
has anything to do with the AUMF. Any future armed conflict implicating the
DPH question—which is to say, any future armed conflict—henceforth would
take place in the shadow of that earlier opinion. Much the same might be said for
frequently employed statutory language like “all necessary and appropriate force,”
moreover.
B. Should Congress Intervene?
Assume for the sake of argument that the emerging habeas jurisprudence does in-
deed involve a substantial degree of disagreement and uncertainty with respect to
individualized detention criteria, and that this disagreement and uncertainty are
important in relation to future cases and to other, collateral matters. It does not fol-
low automatically that Congress should step in with legislation designed to address
the situation.
One might oppose legislative intervention on the ground that the process of re-
fining the law in this area should be left in the hands of the judiciary. Judges, after
all, routinely disagree about fine points of law concerning complex subjects, and
the appellate review over time will tend to smooth out such discrepancies in the
traditional common law fashion. This is, in fact, the argument advanced by a pair
of advocacy groups—Human Rights First and the Constitution Project—in a doc-
ument titled Habeas Works: Federal Courts’ Proven Capacity to Handle Guan-
tanamo Cases: A Report from Retired Federal Judges.263 The report contends that the
“lower courts are steadily progressing toward a workable detention standard,”264
and denies that judges have to “draft” a substantive standard or otherwise are en-
gaged in a “lawmaking” process. What the judges are doing instead, the report ar-
gues, is merely “interpreting and applying” the detention standard established by
Congress and the President in the AUMF as informed by the laws of war.265 To the
extent that the report acknowledges any variation among the judges, it character-
izes that variation benignly as the mere “gradual exploration and shaping of the
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detention standard,” in traditional common law–like fashion.266 Habeas Works
concludes that “there is no reason to doubt the ability of the three-level federal
court system to develop a substantive detention standard.”267
That last claim no doubt is correct. As Judge Wilkinson’s opinion in Al-Marri il-
lustrates, judges can undertake to develop detention standards meant to conform
to the peculiarities of the non-State-actor context. And so too no one doubts that
the common law process in theory can smooth out the many disagreements that
actually arise when judges undertake to do this, much as courts in the past used
case-by-case adjudication to develop and amend substantive rules for torts, con-
tracts and the like. But this is a straw man argument. The important question is
whether it would be better for Congress to play the primary role in crafting the
details of the detention standard.
There are several factors to consider in thinking about this question. First, one
could select between these approaches based on the normative desirability of the
substantive standard one believes is most likely to be produced in the end by each.
On close inspection, however, the two options may be close to a wash along this
dimension.
Those who would prefer to see greater restraints on the government’s capacity
to detain might at first blush be inclined to disfavor legislation on the theory that
Congress most likely would adopt a broad detention standard and that the judi-
ciary over time will settle upon a more constrained approach. Proponents of a
broad standard, by the same token, might favor legislation for the same reason. The
Democratic-controlled Congress in 2009 and 2010 persistently used the power of
the purse to make it more difficult for the President to close Guantanamo, after all,
and the Republican takeover of the House in 2010 might be expected to tilt Con-
gress still further toward erring on the side of facilitating rather than restraining
military detention. But careful consideration of the trends in the caselaw described
in Part II suggests that it would be unwise to assume that the judiciary in the end
will adopt narrower tests. The sequence of D.C. Circuit opinions in 2010, begin-
ning but by no means ending with Al-Bihani, if anything suggests the contrary.
And though many of the Circuit’s decisions are now the subject of pending certio-
rari petitions, it would be foolish to assume that the Supreme Court will both take
up the substantive-scope question and adopt more constrained positions with re-
spect to it; Justice Kagan is recused from these cases in light of her recent role as the
Solicitor General, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito
are unlikely to be interested in such a narrowing approach.
Fear of, or desire for, a broad detention standard accordingly does not point
clearly in favor of or against legislative intervention. What other factors, then,
might one bring to bear in developing a well-considered position on the question?
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Second, one could focus on the democratic pedigree of the resulting rule set.
That is, one might favor legislative intervention because the lawmaking process
would do more to contribute to a national debate and public engagement on the
question, and the resulting rules would in any event bear a superior stamp of dem-
ocratic legitimacy. In response, one might note that we routinely have relied on
common law processes to develop and refine rules in other important settings. But
it is not clear we ever have done so in a context that impacted contemporaneous
military operations to this extent. Here, the question at issue is one that speaks di-
rectly to an issue of pressing national concern: just who is it that the United States
purports to be at war with? A strong argument can be made that the United States
has a moral obligation to engage in a forthright national debate on this subject if we
are to have military detention at all; indeed, that argument has been made, and it is
rather convincing.268
Third, one might favor or disfavor legislation on grounds of speed and finality
in light of my argument that lingering uncertainty regarding the precise bound-
aries of detention authority is harmful. For example, one might argue that legisla-
tion will settle the substantive-scope question more quickly than the ongoing
process of common law development. That process, after all, dates back at least to
the initial decision by Judge Mukasey in Padilla in late 2002, and does not seem
likely to end anytime soon. Anticipating this concern, Habeas Works argues that
some amount of residual ambiguity—and thus some need for case-by-case clarifi-
cation—invariably will remain even in the event of a legislative intervention.269
This is true, but the reduction in ambiguity via a statute if carefully designed could
reduce the total amount of work left to be accomplished through the habeas lens.
Then again, an inartfully drafted statute could achieve the opposite by introducing
entirely new ambiguities and undoing points of consensus already established
through the existing habeas jurisprudence.
Fourth, one might take account of the fact that legislative rulemaking as a
general proposition is more easily revisited than rules derived through the ha-
beas process. Should experience demonstrate that a statutory definition of the
bounds of detention authority is too broad or too narrow, that definition can be
revised in the ordinary course of further legislation. Inclusion of a sunset provi-
sion in legislation, moreover, could guarantee periodic reassessment. Judicially
crafted rules are not so readily altered, however. The judiciary is reactive rather
than proactive. It must have a case or controversy in order to have the occasion to
take up a question, and hence the opportunity to revise the substantive scope of
detention authority may or may not be there even if the existing standard proves
unwise. Even assuming a proper case arises, moreover, the time lag between the
beginning of a case and final judgment by the last court to consider the matter
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can be substantial—particularly if it is necessary for the Supreme Court to inter-
vene in order to limit or reverse precedent.
These factors, taken together, incline me to think that legislation on the
substantive-scope question would in fact be desirable, at least in the abstract. In
particular, it would be desirable to have express statutory language that
• confirms that membership in an AUMF-covered group is a sufficient condi-
tion for detention;
• provides that participation on such a group’s chain of command, knowing
attendance at a military-style training camp operated by such a group and perhaps
other factors constitute substantial but not dispositive evidence of membership;
• articulates a mens rea standard for membership, such as a requirement that
the individual not only knew the identity of the group but intended to become an
active participant in its affairs and thereby to facilitate, directly or indirectly, the
unlawful ends of the group;270
• takes a clear position on whether the provision of support independent of
membership can count as a sufficient condition to justify detention, and articu-
lates a corresponding mens rea element such as intent to facilitate, directly or indi-
rectly, the group’s unlawful use of violence; and
• specifies whether there are any geographic limitations as to the availability of
detention (e.g., limiting detention to persons captured outside the United States,
or limiting support-based detention to persons captured in connection with com-
bat operations).
All that said, any serious discussion of legislative intervention also must account for
the fact that in no plausible scenario would Congress address only the substantive-
scope question. Rather, if it reaches this question at all, Congress almost certainly
would simultaneously address any number of other related matters, including the
procedural and evidentiary rules associated with habeas review. Depending on
what one expects Congress to produce on those issues, then, even someone who
supports the idea of legislation on the substantive-scope question may conclude
that legislation on the whole is undesirable.
* * *
We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in military custody in the
contexts that matter most to US national security today—i.e., counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency. More to the point, federal judges lack consensus on this
question. They have grappled with it periodically since 2002, and for the past three
years have dealt with it continually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus
litigation arising out of Guantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 2008
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decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention jurispru-
dence is shot through with disagreement on points large and small. As a result, the
precise boundaries of the government’s detention authority remain unclear de-
spite the passage of more than nine years since the first post-9/11 detainees came
into US custody.
We should not be surprised at this disagreement. The conflicting efforts of the
judges reflect the fact that the very metrics of legality are deeply contested in this
setting. We do not agree which bodies of law should govern in the first instance
and, even if we did, we then encounter indeterminacy and plausible disagreement
with respect to what each body of law actually has to say, if anything, about the
detention-scope question. Making matters worse, these difficulties arise in a con-
text in which familiar legal frameworks experience substantial evolutionary pres-
sures, making it difficult to distinguish descriptive and normative arguments
about the legal limits of the government’s authority. Against this backdrop it be-
comes easy to see that the judges at times are speaking past one another, much as
occurs in the larger public debate.
Understandable or not, though, this state of affairs is problematic. Most obvi-
ously, it renders the prospects for success in the Guantanamo habeas litigation un-
certain for both the government and the detainees. More significantly, however,
the failure to resolve the detention-scope question casts a shadow across an array of
military activities that are not directly subject to habeas review. The mixed pro-
nouncements overhang detention operations in Afghanistan that are not subject to
habeas review, insofar as those detentions depend on the same underlying claims
of authority that undergird the government’s position in the Guantanamo litiga-
tion. And by the same token, the habeas caselaw may have the same spillover effect
on targeting operations—i.e., the use of lethal force—in places as varied as
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.
It is important to bring these disagreements, their causes and their conse-
quences to the surface, and to push for their resolution. The Obama administra-
tion, after all, is not going to abandon the use of military detention. The
Guantanamo habeas litigation will not conclude for years to come. The use of de-
tention in Afghanistan will persist for some time. Even in Iraq—even after the sup-
posed end of combat operations—a small population of US-controlled military
detainees continues to exist, and will do so for some time. Uses of lethal force, via
drone strikes and otherwise, will continue with respect to al Qaeda targets in vari-
ous spots around the world for the foreseeable future. Were it all to end tomorrow,
moreover, we could still expect future situations to arise in which another adminis-
tration decides to employ military detention in a setting involving terrorism or in-
surgency, giving rise to the same set of issues.
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Simply put, the problem is embedded in our evolving strategic context—partic-
ularly in the perception that non-State actors have become increasingly empow-
ered, to the point that some can pose a strategically significant threat. Insofar as law
and strategic context exist in dynamic relationship with one another, then, the
question is not whether the law will adapt to these circumstances. It will, sooner or
later, more or less appropriately. The question, instead, concerns which institu-
tions we will rely upon to mediate that process.
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392 (citing, inter alia, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 13–15, 48 (1961)).
81. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). The same plurality also concluded that Hamdi, as a citizen with
Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights, should receive more process in the course of
determining whether he was a Taliban fighter. See id. at 533–34. The government soon thereafter
released Hamdi, sending him back to Saudi Arabia after he agreed in writing to relinquish his
claim to US citizenship.
82. See id. at 519–20.
83. See id. at 518.
84. Id. at 515–16 (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942); In re Territo, 156 F.2d
142, 148 (9th Cir. 1946)); id. at 592 (Thomas, J.) (concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cit-
ing Quirin).
85. Id. at 522 n.1.
86. Id. at 521.
87. See Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
88. Id. at 587–91.
89. Id. at 592–93.
90. Id. at 593–98.
91. See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
92. Id. at 714–18.
93. Id. at 718.
94. Id. at 719–24.
95. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). The dissent by Justice Stevens did offer the view
that Padilla’s detention could not be sustained on the merits if the government’s justification for
it rested entirely on the desire to interrogate him. See id. at 465 (“Executive detention of subver-
sive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be
justified to prevent persons from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, how-
ever, be justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract information.”).
96. Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 687 (D.S.C. 2005).
97. Id. at 686.
98. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
99. Id. at 392.
100. Id. at 389–90.
101. Id. at 391–92.
102. Id. at 392, 393.
103. Al-Marri initially sought habeas review in Illinois but, like Padilla, eventually was
obliged to refile in South Carolina. See al-Marri v. Rumsfeld, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Ill.
2003) (holding that petition had to be filed in district in which al-Marri was held at the time of
filing), aff’d, 360 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2004).
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104. See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 676–77 (D.S.C. 2005).
105. Id. at 679–80.
106. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2007).
107. Id. at 174–75.
108. Id. at 175.
109. Id. at 175–76.
110. Id. at 178–79.
111. Id. at 179 n.8 (asserting that civilians under LOAC categorically are “not subject to mili-
tary seizure or detention”).
112. Id. at 178–79 (citing GPW, supra note 63, arts. 2, 4, 5 and GC, supra note 66, art. 4).
113. Id. at 179–82.
114. Id. at 184–85.
115. Id. at 182.
116. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
117. See id. at 221–52.
118. See id at 259–60.
119. See id at 260–61.
120. See id 261–62.
121. Id. at 286 (noting the Charming Betsy canon favoring constructions of statute to comport
with international law, but concluding that the AUMF is sufficiently clear so as to trump any
contrary customary law rule).
122. Id. at 285. But see id. at 288 (emphasizing allegation that al-Marri was a member of al
Qaeda since 1996, as opposed to emphasizing his conduct in entering the United States to con-
duct or support an attack).
123. Id. at 287 n.5.
124. Id. at 293.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 293–303.
127. Id. at 312.
128. Id. at 313.
129. Id. at 314.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 315.
132. Id. at 315–19.
133. Id. at 319.
134. See id. at 318–19.
135. Id. at 317.
136. Id. at 316 (quoting Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 2114).
137. Id. at 316–17.
138. Id. at 319–21.
139. Id. at 314–19. He made this point clear at the very outset of his opinion, in fact, observing
that the “advance and democratization of technology proceeds apace” and that, as a result, “we
live in an age where thousands of human beings can be slaughtered by a single action and where
large swaths of urban landscapes can be leveled in an instant.” Id. at 293. The law must “show
some recognition of these changing circumstances,” must “reflect the actual nature of modern
warfare.” Id.
140. Id. at 314. See also id. at 319. Note that Judge Wilkinson elsewhere in the opinion quotes
expressly from Philip Bobbitt’s Shield of Achilles, a central text supporting the proposition of a
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dynamic relationship between law and strategic context—not to mention the notion that non-
State actors engaging in mass-casualty terrorism strongly implicate that relationship. See id. at
300. Judge Wilkinson plainly was aware of, and in agreement with, this line of argument.
141. Id. at 319.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 293.
144. Id. at 322–25.
145. Id. at 325.
146. See id. at 323.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 324.
149. See Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S.Ct. 1545 (2009).
150. In 2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the DTA did not apply to
habeas petitions that were pending at the time the DTA was enacted, at least insofar as its military
commission–related provisions were concerned. 548 U.S. 557. Congress responded by enacting
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which in effect made the jurisdictional provisions of the
DTA applicable to pending cases. This set the stage for the Supreme Court in Boumediene to hold
that the MCA violated the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, and that the detainees were entitled
to habeas review as a constitutional matter.
151. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that detainees had no
judicially enforceable substantive rights notwithstanding Rasul).
152. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005).
153. See id. at 474–77.
154. Id. at 475 (citing, inter alia, Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224–25 (1961) (holding
that criminal punishment of membership in a subversive organization would violate the Fifth
Amendment unless the statute were construed to require proof that the defendant’s membership
was more than merely nominal and that the defendant specifically intended to further the orga-
nization’s unlawful ends)).
155. Id. at 476. Redactions in the opinion make it difficult to determine more about her rea-
soning, but the context strongly suggests that she was particularly concerned that the govern-
ment might be detaining individuals strictly for their intelligence value. See id. at 477.
156. Perhaps it was not surprising that Judge Green would make a point of attempting to re-
strain the government’s capacity to detain based on associated ties. During oral argument in the
case, she had posed a series of hypothetical questions to the government attorney with the
apparent aim of clarifying the government’s conception of the outer boundaries of the ostensi-
ble authority to detain on the basis that a person provided support to an AUMF-covered group.
Specifically, she asked whether this detention criterion would be met by a “little old lady in Swit-
zerland” who was duped into providing funds to a charity group that turned out to be an al
Qaeda front. One might have expected the attorney to answer no, as this fact pattern at a mini-
mum does not involve inculpatory mens rea. But it did not turn out that way. The government
attorney insisted, incredibly, that all were detainable. The moment would go on to dubious im-
mortality in Judge Green’s published opinion, not to mention becoming a standard citation in
the secondary literature; it would be hard to overestimate its iconic value as a symbol for those
who feared that the post-9/11 assertion of detention authority had become detached from any
real legal constraints.
157. See Brief for Petitioner, Boumediene v. Bush, No. 06-1196, 2007 WL 2441590 (Aug. 24,
2007).
158. See id. at 36–37.
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159. See id. at 39.
160. See id. at 39–41.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009). More to the point, see the collection of materials generated in the
fractious process of attempting to generate consensus in the process that resulted in the ICRC’s
publication, posted here: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/direct-participation
-article-020709 (last visited Dec. 8, 2010).
164. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 157, at 39–40.
165. See id. at 41.
166. See id. (stating that DPH would “certainly cover Osama Bin Laden—and conceivably
others who have submitted themselves to the direction and control of an organization like al
Qaeda”).
167. See id. at 40–41.
168. 553 U.S. 723.
169. See WITTES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 12, at 86–105 (summarizing deci-
sions as to twenty-four individuals whose petitions were resolved as of January 2010). For
the ten decisions denying relief between January and December 2010, see Obaydullah v.
Obama (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2010); al-Bihani v. Obama (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2010) (involving detainee
Toffiq Nasser Awad al-Bihani) (available at https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public
_doc?2005cv2386-1773); al Kandari v. United States (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2010) (involving detainee
Fayiz Mohammed Ahmed al Kandari); Khan v. Obama (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2010) (involving de-
tainee Shawali Khan); Sulayman v. Obama (D.D.C. July 20, 2010) (involving detainee Abd Al
Rahman Abdu Abu Al Ghayth); Khalifh v. Obama (D.D.C. May 28, 2010) (involving detainee
Omar Mohammed Khalifh); Abdah v. Obama (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 2010) (involving detainee Yasein
Khasem Mohammed Esmail); Al Warafi v. Obama (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) (involving detainee
Mukhtar Yahia Naji al Warafi); Al Adahi v. Obama, 692 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2010)
(involving detainee Suleiman Awadh Bin Agil Al-Nadhi); Al Adahi v. Obama (D.D.C. Mar. 10,
2010) (involving detainee Fahmi Salem Al-Assani). For the six individuals who prevailed on
their habeas petitions between January and August 22, 2010, see Abdah v. Obama (D.D.C. July
21, 2010) (involving detainee Adnan Farhan Abd al Latif); Almerfedi v. Obama (D.D.C. July 23,
2010) (involving detainee Hussain Salem Mohammad Almerfedi); Abdah v. Obama (D.D.C.
May 26, 2010) (involving detainee Mohamed Mohamed Hassan Odaini); Al Harbi v. Obama,
May 13, 2010 (D.D.C. May 10, 2010) (involving detainee Ravil Mingazov); Abdah v. Obama
(D.D.C. Apr. 21, 2010) (involving detainee Uthman Abdul Rahim Muhammed Uthman); Salahi
v. Obama (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2010) (involving detainee Mohammedou Ould Salahi).
170. The four affirmances are Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), Awad v.
Obama (D.C. Cir. June 2, 2010), Barhoumi v. Obama (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2010) and al Odah v.
United States (D.C. Cir. 2010). The reversal occurred in Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C.
Cir. 2010).
171. See al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2010).
172. See Salahi v. Obama (D.C. Cir. Nov. 5, 2010).
173. For an overview, see Lyle Denniston, Primer: The New Detainee Cases, SCOTUSblog
(Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/12/primer-the-new-detainee-cases/.
174. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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175. Not long after the Uighur decision, the D.C. Circuit determined that DTA review should
be discontinued in favor of the habeas proceedings mandated by Boumediene. See Bismullah v.
Gates, 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
176. For a general overview of the issues broached in the cases, see WITTES, CHESNEY &
BENHALIM, supra note 12, passim.
177. 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2009).
178. Id. at 34.
179. See id. at 35. Judge Huvelle’s opinion does not actually explain the nature of what had
been widely disclosed to the public. A Washington Post article from February 2009 describes
Basardh as having cooperated extensively with US authorities, indicating that this had become
known to other detainees and that Basardh was thought to be in danger from them. See Del
Quintin Wilber, Detainee-Informer Presents Quandary for Government, WASHINGTON POST,
Feb. 3, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
02/02/AR200902023337_pf.html.
180. See Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp. 2d 20, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (Robertson, J.); Anam v.
Obama, No. 04-1194, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2010) (Hogan, J.).
181. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that “[w]hether a detainee
would pose a threat to U.S. interests if released is not at issue in habeas corpus proceedings”).
182. See Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2008). Recall that Judge Leon years
earlier in Khalid v. Bush had declined to reach this question on the ground that the detainees
lacked any substantive rights supporting such an inquiry.
183. Id. at 134.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. See Exec. Order No. 13493, § 1, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 27, 2009) (Review of Detention
Policy Options).
187. See 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).
188. See id. at 55–56.
189. See id. at 65.
190. Id. at 62.
191. See id. at 63.
192. See id. at 63–64.
193. Id. at 63.
194. Id. at 64 n.15.
195. See id. at 66–67.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 68.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See id. at 68–70.
203. See id. at 68.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See id.
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207. See id. This view is consistent with In re Territo, a World War II case in which an Italian-
American POW unsuccessfully argued that because his job in the Italian Army amounted to
non-combat manual labor, he should not be held in detention. See 156 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1946).
208. 609 F. Supp. 2d at 69–70.
209. Id. at 69–70 & n.17.
210. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
211. See id. at 73.
212. Id. at 75.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 75–76.
215. See id. at 76–77.
216. See id. at 75–77.
217. See Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that Hamlily is “not in-
consistent” with Gherebi, and that any apparent difference “is largely one of form rather than
substance”).
218. See Al Odah v. Obama, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2009).
219. See 677 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
220. See id. at 5–6.
221. See id. at 6–7.
222. See id. passim.
223. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
224. See id. at 871–72.
225. See id. at 872–73.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 873 n.2.
229. See id.
230. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
231. See 590 F.3d at 871.
232. 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
233. See id. at 10–12.
234. See id.
235. 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
236. See id. at 424–26.
237. Charlie Savage, Obama Team Is Divided on Anti-Terror Tactics, NEW YORK TIMES,
Mar. 28, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/us/politics/29force.html
?pagewanted=all.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. Boumediene v. Obama, No. 08-5537 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 22, 2009) (letter from Sharon
Swingle of the Justice Department’s Civil Division to the Clerk of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit), at 1.
246. Id. at 1–2.
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247. Savage, supra note 237.
248. 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
249. 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
250. 2010 WL 2756551 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2010).
251. 625 F.3d 745.
252. Khan v. Obama (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2010) (citations omitted).
253. See Almerfedi v. Obama, No. 05-1645, 2010 WL 2899060 (D.D.C. July 8, 2010).
254. See Sulayman v. Obama (D.D.C. July 20, 2010).
255. Cf. United States v. Maldonado, Superseding Criminal Complaint (prosecuting de-
fendant for receiving military-style training from al Qaeda, though the training was pro-
vided by al Shabab in Somalia), available at http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/Maldonado
_Complaint.pdf.
256. For an introduction to this debate, see Robert Chesney, Has Human Rights Watch
Changed Its Position on Targeted Killing and the Field of Application of IHL?, LAWFARE (Dec. 9,
2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/12/has-human-rights-watch-changed-its-position
-on-targeted-killing-and-the-scope-of-application-of-ihl/. The targeted killing suit recently was
dismissed by Judge Bates on standing and political question grounds in Al-Aulaqi v. Obama
(D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2010).
257. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
258. 605 F.3d at 97–98.
259. Id. at 98–99.
260. Id. at 99.
261. We may yet also see litigation involving the scope of detention authority involving US
citizens allegedly held by other States under US direction or control—so-called “proxy deten-
tion.” See Press Release, ACLU of Southern California, ACLU/SC Suit Seeks Information on U.S.
‘Proxy Detention’ of American Citizen in the U.A.E. (Aug. 18, 2010), available at https://
www.aclu-sc.org/releases/view/103037.
262. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights recently
made waves by filing a suit challenging the government’s claim of authority to use lethal force
against Anwar al-Aulaqi, an American citizen alleged to be a member of al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. See supra note 5. That suit is remarkable precisely because such litigation is exceed-
ingly rare. No earlier suit seeks to preclude the use of lethal military force against a particular in-
dividual. Prior attempts to restrain the government from exercising military force at a more
general level, such as efforts to stop the use of military force in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos,
largely foundered in the face of justiciability objections. And at least for the time being, so too has
the al-Aulaqi litigation. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2010) (dismissing complaint on
standing and political question grounds).
263. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HABEAS WORKS: FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN CAPACITY TO
HANDLE GUANTANAMO CASES: A REPORT FROM RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGES 13–16 (2010) [here-
inafter REPORT FROM RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGES], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
wp-content/uploads/pdf/Habeas-Works-final-web.pdf. In the interest of full disclosure, I note
that Habeas Works criticizes a report I coauthored with Benjamin Wittes and Rabea Benhalim in
which we contend that the judges in the habeas cases have been left by Congress and the Presi-
dent to craft most of the substantive and procedural law governing the habeas proceedings. See
id. at 27 (criticizing WITTES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 12).
264. Id. at 13–16.
265. Id.
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266. Id. at 16.
267. Id.
268. See BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND DENIAL (forthcoming 2011).
269. REPORT FROM RETIRED FEDERAL JUDGES, supra note 263, at 28.
270. Cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 209 (1961) (permitting a criminal prosecution
on membership grounds where a person is an active member of a group who intends to facilitate
the group’s unlawful ends).
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